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Shareholder derivative suits permit a shareholder to bring a lawsuit on
behalf of the corporation, against a third party, when the corporation proves
unwilling or unable to bring the claim on its own behalf.1 The shareholder
is merely a nominal plaintiff in the suit.2 The third party sued is often a
corporate insider.3 Stockholders who do not also serve as directors or
officers could be quite vulnerable without the mechanism of derivative
litigation.4 Their misbehaving managers are unlikely to authorize the
corporation to file a lawsuit against themselves to enforce a corporate right
or duty.5 In such cases, in the absence of derivative litigation, these
shareholders would be at the mercy of their managers, subject only to any
state law fiduciary duties that might inspire these managers not to
misbehave.6 This derivative litigation process may be the only avenue of
1. GARYLOCKWOOD, LAW OFCORPORATEOFFICERS&DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION&
INSURANCE § 1:4 (2d ed. 2020-21). According to Professor Matheson:
The crux of the derivative suit is that a shareholder seeks to have the corporation
enforce supposed rights or claims that the corporation has not yet asserted. . . .
[T]he historical focus of the derivative suit has been an attempt by shareholders
to hold the corporate board or officers accountable for perceived harm to the
corporation caused by a violation of their fiduciary duties.
John Matheson, Restoring the Promise of the Shareholder Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV.
327, 334 (2016). See also Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 74, 78 (1967) (emphasizing the role of derivative litigation as a “needed policeman”).
2. C. HUGH FRIEDMAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE CORPORATIONS, Ch 6-G
(2020).
3. See Miriam R. Albert, Security For Expense Statute: Easing Shareholder
Hopelessness?, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 33, 35 (2019) (“The quintessential derivative
suit is one filed by a shareholder to force the corporation to sue a manager for fraud, which is
admittedly an awkward and likely unpleasant endeavor. . . .”).
4. Id. at 35. See also Larry E. Ribstein, Litigating in LLCs, 64 BUS. LAW. 739, 740
(2009) (describing the derivative suit remedy in the limited liability company context).
5. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITYCOMPANIES § 13:3 (2020).
6. According to Professors Ribstein and Keatinge: “As such the derivative action serves
an important policing function in providing a mechanism by which those charged with
management and control of a venture may be called upon to demonstrate that they are in fact
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relief available to those shareholders lacking concurrent management roles
who allege neglect, malfeasance, or intentional misconduct on the part of
their managers.7
Arguably, corporate shareholders are not the only group of owners who
may need redress for perceived managerial neglect or malfeasance; members
of limited liability companies (LLCs) and limited partners can be just as
vulnerable as their shareholder brethren to managers who are not honoring
their fiduciary duties.8 In this context, the role of LLC members and limited
partners is arguably comparable to that of a corporate shareholder who has
no concurrent management role.9 Without structural avenues for relief like
discharging the obligations they have voluntarily undertaken.” Id.
7. See Bryant G. Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & Sheldon J. Plager, Empirical Research and
the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 137 (1985) (describing the shareholder derivative suit as a check on corporate
mismanagement).
When control and investment are separated, as is so often the case in the modern
business corporation, the accountability of management to the shareholders
becomes a central concern. This concern is triggered by, but not limited to, the
shareholders’ narrow pecuniary interest: it implicates notions of mutuality of
consent, of fair dealing, and of moral responsibility to those over whom or over
whose interests one has power. In this context the responsibilities of the
corporate manager are often cast in terms of fiduciary duties—duties which
historically have arisen out of relationships of trust and confidence.
Id. at 138. Current corporate laws have not been effective in stopping this kind of director
misconduct, so “stockholders, in face of gravest abuses, were singularly impotent in obtaining
redress of abuses of trust.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
In these situations, shareholders are arguably in “need of legal [strategies] to protect
them[selves] from abuses by [] management.” Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the
American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 927 (1983).
8. See Ribstein, supra note 4, at 747 (arguing that limited partners are more vulnerable
to managerial misconduct than shareholders).
Where ownership and control of an enterprise are vested in the same population,
the need for a corrective mechanism like a derivative suit is greatly lessened
because the owner/managers’ self-interests will arguably guide managerial
conduct. But where ownership and control are in separate hands, the incentives
change and managerial conduct may not conform to the owners’ views of the best
course of action. This may lead to what the owners consider to be director
misconduct.
Albert, supra note 3, at 36.
9. Some commentators oppose extending the derivative litigation mechanism to
members of LLCs, arguing that the situation of LLC members differs from that of
shareholders and limited partners because LLC members can, and often do take an active role
in management of the entity.
[T]he appropriateness of LLC derivative suits is debatable. LLC statutes are
designed for closely held firms that do not involve the logistical problems the
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the mechanism of derivative litigation, these owners could be left with only
the options of exercising their potentially limited voting rights in an effort to
effect change, or selling their ownership interests outright.10
The LLC is a hybrid form of business, combining features of
corporations, general partnerships and to a lesser degree, limited
partnerships.11 LLCs provide investors with popular features of the
corporate and general partnership structures, offering owners the limited
liability of the corporate structure and the favorable, pass-through tax
treatment of the general partnership.12 The underlying forms of business that
are blended into the LLC have some significant structural differences; thus,
the hybrid entity emerges as a bit of a mixed bag, operating more like a
corporation in some contexts and more like a general partnership in other
contexts.13 The LLC does not fit fully or comprehensively into the entirety
of the existing doctrine from either the corporate or partnership form, but
rather falls into some of each.14 Limited partnerships are also a hybrid,
derivative remedy is intended to solve. It therefore makes little apparent sense to
saddle closely held LLCs with the costs of derivative suits. Alternative remedies
would serve the same basic functions at lower cost, at least in closely held firms.
Ribstein, supra note 4, at 741.
10. Limited partners’ voting rights are typically not as extensive as their general partner
counterparts’ voting rights; to retain their limited partner status, they cannot manage the
enterprise, and their voting rights are typically, for lack of a better term, limited. See generally
Don Augustine, Peter M. Fass, Marshall N. Lester & James F. Robinson, The Liability of
Limited Partners Having Certain Statutory Rights Affecting the Basic Structure of the
Partnership, 31 BUS. LAW. 2087, 2088 (1976) (listing examples of voting rights a limited
partner can exercise under state law).
11. The hybrid nature of this form of business is supported by the background comments
to the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act that noted the drafters “relied substantially”
on the Revised Uniform Partnership Act for provisions governing member-managed LLCs;
for provisions governing manager-managed LLCs, the drafters used an “amalgam” from the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act and the Model Business Corporation Act. NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE L., REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY ACT 1
(2006), https://users.wfu.edu/palmitar/ICBCorporations-Companion/Conexus/UniformActs/
ULLCA2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ63-EJD4].
12. Carol Goforth, Too Many Cooks Spoil the Cake, and Too Many Statutes Spoil the
LLC: A Plea for Uniformity, 46 SW. L. REV. 63, 67 (2016).
13. “The LLC is a hybrid form of business, combining features of both corporations and
partnerships; that said, other than the corporate-like limited liability highlighted by its’ very
name, the LLC more closely resembles a partnership.” Miriam R. Albert, The New York LLC
Act at Twenty: Is Piercing Still “Enveloped in the Midst of Metaphor?, 31 TOURO L. REV.
411, 413 (2015); see alsoDaniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All the Veils: Applying an Established
Doctrine to a New Business Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 552 (2007) (describing the structure
of the LLC).
14. For example, some LLCs fall within the definition of “security” for purposes of the
federal securities laws, and some do not, depending on whether the owners have an
expectation of profits predominantly from the efforts of others. SeeMiriam R. Albert, The
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bridging between corporations and general partnerships, albeit with different
roles, rights and liabilities for the general partner and for the limited
partner.15 The hybrid nature of the LLCs and limited partnership structures
can raise challenging issues when considering derivative litigation: are these
entities acting more like corporations or partnerships?
Every state authorizes shareholder derivative litigation, and the vast
majority extend this remedy to LLCs and limited partnerships.16 As the
availability and incidence of derivative litigation has expanded over time, a
number of procedural hurdles have evolved in an effort to limit nuisance or
strike suits.17 The theory is that these strike suits are brought by small
shareholders, and the need to post a bond may deter these shareholders from
bringing these suits.18 As part of this effort, some states have enacted
“security for expense” provisions, requiring owners to post a bond to cover
the defendants’ expenses before they can proceed with their suit.19 A few
states have also enacted such provisions for derivative suit by LLC members
Howey Test Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading This Test on a Curve?, 2 WM. &MARY BUS.
L.REV. 1, 19 (2011) (discussing the fourth prong of theHowey test which requires expectation
of profits solely from the efforts of others).
Determination of whether corporate doctrines apply, or whether corresponding
(but different) doctrines in partnership law apply, is difficult
because limited liability companies share some attributes of corporations and
some attributes of partnerships. The problem is compounded because most states
have neither codified nor, by statute, rejected these common law doctrines.
Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrine to Limited Liability
Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 45 (1994).
15. “Limited partnerships offered at least some owners protection against personal
liability for enterprise-level debts, but they obtained that protection at the cost of any right to
participate in management or control of the business.” Goforth, supra note 12, at 77.
16. According to Professor Ribstein:
The derivative remedy has been applied to limited partnerships but not to general
partnerships. What about LLCs, which share features of both types of firms? So
far the legislative debate seems to have been settled in favor of extension to this
context. The derivative remedy has now found its way to approximately three-
fourths of the LLC statutes with little discussion either in legislatures or academia
as to whether the remedy is appropriate in this context. The inclusion of the
derivative remedy in the recently promulgated Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act suggests that the derivative remedy may continue to be a
staple of LLC statutes.
Ribstein, supra note 4, at 740.
17. Security For Expenses Legislation—Summary, Analysis, and Critique, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 267, 267–68 (1952) [hereinafter Security for Expenses Legislation Summary].
18. Id. at 269.
19. For a full discussion of these corporate security for expense provisions, see Albert,
supra note 3.
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and/or limited partners.20
In the context of whether and how to bring a derivative suit, the
challenges facing shareholders, LLC members, and limited partners can be
quite similar, yet the states’ treatment of who and how to post a bond before
filing a derivative suits is uneven and inconsistent.21 This Article focuses on
security for expense provisions applicable to LLCs and limited partnerships,
providing an analysis and evaluation of the rights of and requirements facing
these owners who, like their shareholder brethren, seek to hold those who
manage their entities accountable for managerial neglect or malfeasance
through the mechanism of derivative litigation.22 This Article identifies the
inconsistencies in states’ approaches to the rights of LLC owners and limited
partners seeking to sue derivatively, specifically exploring whether such
owners are required to post a bond as security for the litigation expenses,
what effect this might have on the utility of derivative litigation generally,
and whether the mechanism of security for expense provisions is adding
value to the process writ large.
Part II provides necessary background on derivative suits generally,
with attention given to the procedures required when such suits are brought
by owners of LLCs and limited partnerships. Part III starts with a brief
examination of the existing corporate security for expense statutes requiring
bond posting by shareholders and then compares this corporate statutory
landscape with the security for expense statutes applicable to LLC members
and to limited partners. This Part also evaluates the limited case law flowing
from the LLC and limited partnership security for expense statutes as part of
a broader evaluation of the usefulness of the bond posting statute as an
effective gatekeeper in derivative litigation across the three forms of business
generally. Part IV provides recommendations aimed at creating owner
empowerment for all “helpless” owners seeking redress against their
managers, whether the business is a corporation, LLC, or limited partnership,
without overwhelming the system with nuisance or strike suits.
20. See infra Part III for a discussion of these states’ security for expenses provisions.
21. Professor Ribstein drew a distinction between vulnerable shareholders and limited
partners, and LLC members, who he argued could “be expected to take a greater role than
limited partners in litigation decisions.” Ribstein, supra note 4, at 747.
22. For a discussion of the various corporate security for expenses statutes, see Albert,
supra note 3.
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II. DERIVATIVE SUITS: HISTORICALCONTEXT ANDBACKGROUND
A. Background on Shareholder Derivative Suits: the Corporate
Landscape
The Supreme Court characterized derivative suits as a “remedy born of
stockholder helplessness” in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corporation, a seminal shareholder derivative case.23 The Court offered this
background on the development of derivative suits:
As business enterprise increasingly sought the advantages of
incorporation, management became vested with almost
uncontrolled discretion in handling other people’s money. The
vast aggregate of funds committed to corporate control came to be
drawn to a considerable extent from numerous and scattered
holders of small interests. The director was not subject to an
effective accountability. That created strong temptation for
managers to profit personally at expense of their trust. The
business code became all too tolerant of such practices. Corporate
laws were lax and were not self-enforcing, and stockholders, in
face of gravest abuses, were singularly impotent in obtaining
redress of abuses of trust.24
Derivative suits have been characterized as “the chief regulator of
corporate management”25 and “the most important procedure the law has yet
developed to police the internal affairs of corporations.”26 But the remedy
of shareholder derivative suits has been subject to significant criticism from
23. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547–48 (1949).
24. Id. at 547–48.
25. Id. at 548.
26. Dykstra, supra note 1 (quoting Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is
Corporate Management Responsible?, THE CORP. IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 48 (Edward
Mason ed. 1959)).
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the courts27 and commentators28 focusing on the potential for abuse. Efforts
to curtail the potential for abuse have resulted in procedural hurdles created
through statutory and case law, with the aspirational goal that somehow only
meritorious derivative suits will move forward, and the nuisance or strike
suits will be weeded out.29
The statutory hurdles facing shareholder plaintiffs seeking to bring
derivative suits can include statutory requirements that plaintiffs:
demonstrate contemporaneous share ownership;30 demonstrate that they
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the corporation in enforcing
its rights;31 plead their case with particularity;32 make a formal demand on
27. As the Supreme Court noted in Cohen:
Unfortunately, the remedy itself provided opportunity for abuse which was not
neglected. Suits sometimes were brought not to redress real wrongs, but to realize
upon their nuisance value. They were bought off by secret settlements in which
any wrongs to the general body of share owners were compounded by the suing
stockholder, who was mollified by payments from corporate assets. These
litigations were aptly characterized in professional slang as ‘strike suits.’ And it
was said that these suits were more commonly brought by small and irresponsible
than by large stockholders, because the former put less to risk and a small interest
was more often within the capacity and readiness of management to compromise
than a large one.
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548.
28. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit:
An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 261–62 (1981)
(“Today, the new threat is judicial, rather than legislative, and if the prophecies of doom are
again to prove false, countervailing legislation may be necessary.”); Garth, et al., supra note
7 at 139 (criticizing the economic theories of the firm that challenge the utility of derivative
suits).
29. The bond posting requirements were designed to help distinguish the strike suits from
the meritorious suits. See Security for Expenses Legislation Summary, supra note 17, at 269–
70 (explaining the goals of the New York security for expenses legislation and other similar
state laws).
The minimum ownership standards which must be met to avoid the New York
security requirement were adopted as a practical method of distinguishing before
trial between strike suits and suits brought for legitimate purposes. That some
legitimate suits by small shareholders are also deterred must be accepted as a
necessary consequence of this legislation.
Id.
30. MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41(1)(2005).
31. Id. § 7.41(2).
32. Franklin S. Wood, the author of a comprehensive study of derivative suits that has
come to be known as “The Wood Report” addresses this challenge: “[d]ealing now with the
sufficiency of particular allegations, the mere allegation of demand and refusal to sue is
insufficient, since it does not adequately establish the exhaustion of the plaintiff’s remedies
before resort to equity.” FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING
STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS 59 (1944) [hereinafter WOODREPORT].
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the corporation to take “suitable” action;33 and finally, comply with any
relevant security for expense statutes.34 It is noteworthy that derivative
plaintiffs, for the most part, must do all this without access to the discovery
process.35 This prompts the question whether the cumulative effect of these
33. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2005). According to Professors Coffee and
Schwartz:
[F]or the better part of this century, corporate law has recognized the simple
axiom that a shareholder seeking to file a derivative suit must first exhaust
available intracorporate remedies bymaking a demand on the corporation’s board
of directors, but never adequately explained the justification underlying this
rule.7. By itself, this demand rule is only a procedural hurdle, and in practice a
fairly inconsequential one, that serves the legitimate purpose of giving the subject
corporation an opportunity to take over the suit as its own or pursue internal
remedies.
Coffee and Schwartz, supra note 28, at 262. According to Mr. Wood: “The difficulty of
drawing a complaint on facts of which the plaintiffs have no first[-]hand knowledge or sources
of information was originally felt to warrant considerable lenience in judging the sufficiency
of a complaint. . . . This view is now believed to have been overruled.” WOODREPORT, supra
note 32, at 58. The current approach in most statutes requiring derivative plaintiffs to make
a formal demand is to require specificity of facts. “The courts have come to recognize this
[unfounded claims], to appraise such general and adverbial allegations at their true value, and
to apply increasing strictures upon general allegations with no specific facts in support of
them.” WOODREPORT, supra note 32, at 59.
34. See infra Part III. For a discussion of one of the first examinations of the derivative
suit in the WOODREPORT, see Albert supra note 3.
His ultimate conclusion and recommendation for a security for expense statute
honored his goal and allowed the shareholders to determine whether to move
forward in any given case, “safeguarded by the requirement that the plaintiff have
a legitimate interest in the subject-matter and assume reasonable responsibility in
the way of costs in the event of failure.” Wood’s idea was that a “legitimate
interest in the subject matter” could be satisfied by some threshold of stock
ownership. This idea is the cornerstone of all of the current security for expense
statutes which began to be adopted following the Wood Report in an effort to
discourage non-meritorious strike suits, starting with New York in 1944.
Albert, supra note 3, at 43 (citing WOOD REPORT, supra note 32, at 116–17). See also Garth
et al., supra note 7, at 140; Donna I. Dennis, Contrivance and Collusion: The Corporate
Origins of Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. 1479,
1519 (2015) (examining the history of strike-suits).
35. The New Jersey statute is a good example:
(c)All discovery proceedings shall be stayed upon the filing by the corporation of
its motion to dismiss and the filing required by this subsection until the notice of
entry of the order ruling on the motion. Notwithstanding the foregoing stay of
discovery, the court, on motion and after a hearing, may order that specified and
limited discovery be conducted if plaintiffs make a good cause showing of
alleged facts which evidence a lack of independence by the person or group
making the determination for the corporation or a lack of a good faith
determination. Limited discovery shall not include the work product, privileged
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hurdles may be actually undermining the utility of the entire derivative
litigation remedy, leaving derivative plaintiffs as “helpless” as the Supreme
Court noted, whether the defendants be shareholders, LLC members or
limited partners.36
B. Derivative Litigation by LLC Members
An evaluation of the landscape of derivative litigation in LLCs
necessitates an understanding of the hybrid nature of this entity and the
resulting variety in states’ approaches to regulating LLCs.37 Since LLCs
communications, or testimony of attorneys who advised or assisted the person or
group making the determination.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §14A:3-6.5. See Feur v. Merck & Co., Inc. 187 A.3d 873, 880 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
2018) (“Within a derivative action, a plaintiff-shareholder may be entitled to “discovery
‘limited to the narrow issue of what steps the directors took to inform themselves of the
shareholder demand and the reasonableness of its decision’” to reject it.”).
36. According to Professor Matheson:
[T]he current state of derivative litigation is encumbered by a series of primarily
procedural impediments that make pursuit of the derivative claim unduly litigious
and its successful prosecution practically impossible.” Matheson, supra note 1,
at 331. Professors Coffee and Schwartz agree: “Although the policies underlying
these barriers express justifiable concerns about the dangers of frivolous litigation
and unjust enrichment, their legislative implementation has been overbroad,
chilling meritorious and nonmeritorious actions alike and unnecessarily
disqualifying truly injured plaintiffs.
Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 28, at 309. According to Professor Scott:
The result of all this seems to be an absurd state of affairs. Ringing statements
on the sacredness of the management’s fiduciary responsibilities are
accompanied by a series of impediments to their enforcement. Each obstacle has
its own peculiar history and rationale, but their unifying theme purports to be fear
of the ‘strike suit’—an unwarranted action brought by an attorney in order to be
bought off for a sum that is less than the costs of defense.
Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 942 (1983). Professor DeMott argues:
[T]he statutes, by permitting defendants to demand that security be posted well
in advance of a final outcome to the litigation, may impose a greater economic
risk on the plaintiff than would a rule which simply shifted the successful
defendant’s expenses to the plaintiff after the final resolution of the litigation. It
was originally believed that these statutes would deter baseless derivative suits,
or suits brought solely to extract a settlement through the “annoyance value” of
the suit.
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW & PRACTICE § 3.1 (2020-
2021).
37. According to Professor Ribstein:
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have features from both corporations and partnerships, it is unsurprising that
drafters have leaned on both corporate and partnership statutory norms in
crafting structures to govern this hybrid.38 The various state LLC statutes, as
a whole, reflect this hybrid nature of the LLC, with some state lawmakers
borrowing more heavily from their corporate statutes39 and others from their
partnership and limited partnership laws when crafting their individual LLC
statutes.40 Some courts borrow from the case law as well, applying corporate
The rapid development of limited liability companies has caused numerous
growing pains as courts and legislatures have searched for appropriate sources
from which to draw the rules for this new business form. Not surprisingly,
legislators and courts frequently apply rules from existing business entities.
Unfortunately, they sometimes apply the wrong analogies.
Ribstein, supra note 4, at 739.
38. “There are close similarities between LLCs and limited partnerships regarding
ownership and transfer of LLC interests, and indeed many LLC statutes borrowed provisions
on these issues from limited partnership statutes.” RIBSTEIN&KEATINGE, supra note 5, at §
9:9. According to Professor Ribstein:
The derivative remedywas not traditionally recognized in partnerships, but ended
up in LLC statutes via the limited partnership . . . . When legislatures throughout
the United States started passing LLC statutes twenty years ago, they faced a
choice of models regarding derivative suit provisions – the general partnership
and early limited partnership statutes containing no derivative suit provisions, or
the more recent developments of limited partnership derivative suits. The choice
was not obvious since both types of business association were models for the
“hybrid” LLC form, and both derivative suits and limited partnerships has been
used for a long time before the courts thought to put the two together.
Ribstein, supra note 4, at 746.
39. In Maryland:
A person described in § 4A-802 of this subtitle may bring a derivative action to
enforce a right of a limited liability company to recover a judgment in its favor
to the same extent that a stockholder may bring an action for a derivative suit
under the corporation law of Maryland.
MD. CODE § 4A-801.
40. According to Professor Goforth:
Every American jurisdiction now authorizes the formation of the LLC.
Unfortunately, there is probably more variation in the provisions of state LLC
acts than for any other kind of widely available form of business, even the
statutory close corporation. One of the reasons for this is that by the time the
Uniform Law Commission first promulgated a Uniform LLC Act in 1994,
“nearly every state had adopted an LLC statute, and those statutes varied
considerably in both form and substance.”
Goforth, supra note 12, at 98.
When we as lawyers, judges, and students of the law engage in statutory
construction, there are certain things that are sacrosanct. The meaning of words
is one. Our system of precedents requires that we thoughtfully build our doctrine,
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law principles to LLC issues.41 This also contributes to sometimes
significant variation in the scope and content of these statutes, opening up
the possibility that similarly situated parties who transact business with LLCs
may have varying outcomes from state to state, depending on the provisions
of states’ LLC acts.42 And some commentators strongly believe derivative
suits are unnecessary for LLC members, particularly those that are closely
held.43 In the case of a closely held LLC, a suit could be authorized by
with careful and appropriate layering of case law to anchor the doctrine. Our
courts should be thoughtful and deliberate in the further development of this
doctrine, in a way that promotes fairness while honoring the legislative intent of
the NYLLCL. New York LLC piercing decisions will thus be supportable as a
matter of law and not just convenience.
Albert, supra note 13, at 438.
41. For example, in Arizona, case law explicitly applies corporate law statutory
principles to LLCs:
The Arizona statutes governing derivative actions by a member in a limited
liability company (“LLC”) closely mirror the statutes governing derivative
actions by shareholders. However, there is no specific Arizona case law
regarding derivative actions by a member of an LLC. However, since the statutes
for derivative actions by shareholders are similar, case law regarding corporate
derivative actions may be used to interpret the LLC derivative action statutes.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:10. See also ICSC Partners, L.P. v. Kenwood Plaza L.P., 116
Ohio App. 3d 278, 284 (1996) (“Although this action involves derivative claims on behalf of
a limited partnership, we find the law governing the settlement of derivative corporate claims
applicable. We review the approval of settlements in limited-partnership derivative actions
for abuse of discretion.”). According to Professor Ribstein:
The New York Court of Appeals decision in Tzolis v. Wolff settled years of
confusion in the New York cases by reading a derivative remedy into the New
York statute. Although there was evidence that the legislature had deliberately
omitted derivative suits from the LLC statute as part of a compromise to get the
act passed, the majority reasoned that legislators might have assumed that courts
would supply the missing remedy as they had for limited partnerships.
Ribstein, supra note 4, at 740 (citing Tzolis v. Wolf, 884 N.E.2d 1005, 1009 (N.Y. 2008)).
42. See Albert, supra note 13, at 414 (“The existing state LLC statutes, however, are far
from uniform and many have been amended on a patchwork basis and have not kept up with
the LLC cases and other legal developments.”) quoting See Why Your State Should Adopt
RULLCA, UNIFF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/Downlo
adDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=36ed703c-12ad-070f-fa01-64010b1dabb6&force
Dialog=0 [https://perma.cc/P947-FZ97] (last visited May 15, 2020).
43. As per the dissent in Tzolis v. Wolff, discussed in infra Part II:
The co-author of the major treatise on limited liability companies—who (unlike
the majority) questions the utility of derivative suits in the LLC context—
advocates the ABA’s approach as “a reasonable compromise” (see Ribstein, The
Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. L. 1, 23 [1995-1996] [“If
the (derivative suit) remedy is justified . . . , it is only because requiring plaintiffs
to seek authorization from the thousands of shareholders of publicly held firms
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disinterested members owning a majority of ownership interests, obviating
the need for a derivative suit.44
One possible lens to glean how the various state lawmakers view this
hybrid form of business, at least anecdotally, may be seen by examining how
the states characterize their LLC statutes as more like a corporation, more
like a partnership, or neither. Twenty five states group their corporate, LLC,
and limited partnership statutes together in one category45 or put each statute
could prevent some legitimate suits,” but “(t)he same point does not apply . . . to
closely held firms. Moreover, LLC members generally have other means of self-
protection at their disposal that corporate shareholders may lack, including a
default right to sell their interests back to the firm and substantial veto and
removal powers.”]).
Tzolis, 10 N.E.3d at 118 (Read, J., dissenting), referencing Ribstein, supra note 4.
44. According to Professors Ribstein and Keatinge:
Opponents of derivative actions may argue that it does not follow that a single
member should be authorized to decide when the substantial cost and disruption
of a suit against the managers is justified. Unlike in a publicly held corporation,
permitting a member vote on the suit or joining all relevant parties will often be
practicable in a closely held LLC. Thus, the suit could be authorized by a
majority of the owners of the firm who do not have a personal interest in the
outcome of the suit. The suit also could be brought directly by joining all affected
members as plaintiffs or defendants.
RIBSTEIN&KEATINGE, supra note 5, at § 13:3.
45. Alabama classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Title 10A: Alabama
Business and Nonprofit Entities Code. ALA. CODE §§ 10A-2-1.01 to 10A-2-17.02; §§ 10A-
5A-1.01 to 10A-5A-12.05; §§ 10A-9A-1.01 to 10A-9A- 11.07. California classifies its
corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Corporations Code. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 100-195;
§§ 17701.01-17713.13; §§ 15900-15901.17. Colorado classifies its corporations, LLCs and
LPS all under its Title 7. Corporations and Associations. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-101 to
7-117-105; §§7-80-101 to 7-80-1101; §§ 7-62-101 to 7-62-1105. The District of Columbia
classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Division V. Local Business Affairs,
Title 29. Business Organizations. D.C. CODE §§ 29-101.01 to 29-107.05; §§ 29-801.01 to 29-
810.01; §§ 29-701.01 to 29-711.01. Florida classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all
under its Title XXXVI. Business Organizations. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0101 to 607.193; §§
605.0101 to 605.1108; §§ 620.081 to 620.2205. Georgia classifies its corporations, LLCs and
LPs all under its Title 14. Corporations, Partnerships and Associations. GA. CODE ANN. §§
14-2-101 to 14-2-1703; §§ 14-11-100 to 14-11-109; §§ 14-9A-1 to 14-9A-130. Idaho
classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Title 30. Corporations. IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 30-29-101 to 30-29-1704; §§ 30-25-101 to 30-25-806; §§ 30-24-101 to 30-24-906.
Illinois classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Chapter 805. Business
Organizations. CH. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/1.01 to 5/17.05; §§ 180/1-1 to 180/60-1; §§
215/0.01 to 215/1402. Indiana classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Title 23.
Business and Other Associations. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-1-1 to 23-1-55-3; §§ 23-18-1-1 to 23-
18-2; §§ 23-16-1-1 to 23-16-12-3. Maryland classifies corporations, LLCs and LPs under the
heading Corporations and Associations. MD. CODEANN., CORPS&ASS’NS §§ 2-101 to 2-612;
§§ 4A-101 to 4A-1303; §§ 10-101 to 10-1105. Minnesota classifies its corporations, LLCs
and LPs all under the heading Business, Social, and Charitable Organizations. MINN. STAT.
2021] SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES 639
in its own category, in each case perhaps showing a legislative view that the
three forms of business are separate and distinct;46 sixteen states group their
corporate and LLC statutes together, with their limited partnership statute
grouped elsewhere, perhaps reflecting a view that LLCs are like
corporations;47 nine states group their LLCs and limited partnership statutes
§§ 302A.001-302A.92; §§ 322C.0101-322C.1205; §§ 321.0101-321.1208. Mississippi
classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPS all under its Title 79. Corporations, Associations,
and Partnerships. MISS. CODE.ANN. §§ 79-4-1.01 to 79-4-17.05; §§ 79-29-101 to 79-29-1317;
79-14-101 to 79-14-1301. Missouri classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its
Title XXIII. Corporations, Associations and Partnerships. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 351.010-
351.720; §§ 347.010-347.189; §§ 359.011-359.271. Montana classifies corporations, LLCs
and LPs under Title 35. Corporations, Partnerships, and Associations. MONT. CODE. ANN. §§
35-1-112 to 35-1-1315; §§ 35-8-101 to 35-8-1307; §§ 35-12-501 to 35-12-522. Nevada
classifies corporations, LLCs, and LPs under Title 7. Business Associations; Securities;
Commodities. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.010-78.785; §§ 86.011-86.590; §§ 87A.005-87A.230.
Ohio classifies it corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Title XVII. Corporations
Partnerships. OHIO REV. CODEANN. §§ 1701.01-1701.99; §§ 1705.01-1705.61; §§ 1782.01-
1782.65. Oregon classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Title 7. Corporations
and Partnerships. OR. REV. STAT. §§60.001-60.992; 63.001-63.990; 70.005-70.070. Rhode
Island classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Title 7. Corporations,
Associations and Partnerships. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-1.2-101 to 7-1.2-1804; §§ 7-16-1 to 7-
16-76; §§ 7-13-1 to 7-13-69. South Carolina classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all
under its Title 33. Corporations, Partnerships and Associations. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 33-1-101
to 33-16-220; §§ 33-44-101 to 33-44-1208; §§ 33-42-10 to 33-42-2140. Texas classifies its
corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Texas Business Organization Code. TEX. BUS.ORGS.
CODEANN. §§ 20.001-21.917; §§ 101.001-101.662; §§ 153.001-153.555. Vermont classifies
its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Title 11. Corporations, Partnerships and
Associations. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 §§ 42-568; §§ 4001-4163; §§ 3401-3503. Wyoming
classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Title 17. Corporations, Partnerships and
Associations. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-16-101 to 17-16-1810; §§ 17-29-101 to 17-29-1105;
§§ 17-14-201 to 17-14-1104.
46. Similarly, three states list statutes governing the three forms of business in their own
separate categories: New York classifies its corporations under Business Corporation Law.
N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 101-2001 (2020); New York classifies its LLCs under Limited Liability
Company Law. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. §§ 101-1403 (2020); and NewYork characterizes its LPs
under its Partnership Law. N.Y. P’SHIP §§ 90-119 (2020). North Carolina classifies its
corporations under Chapter 55 North Carolina Business Corporation Act. N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 55-1-01 to 55-17-05 (West 1989); North Carolina classifies its LLCs under Chapter
57D. North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 57D-1-01 to
57D-11-03 (West 2014); and North Carolina classifies its LPs under Chapter 59. Partnership.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-101 to 59-11047 (West 1985). West Virginia classifies its
corporations under its Chapter 31D. West Virginia Business Corporation Act. W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31D-a-101 to 31D-17-1703 (West 2002); West Virginia classifies its LLCs under its
Chapter 31B. Uniform Limited Liability Company Act. W. VA. CODEANN. §§ 31B-1-101 to
31B-13-1306 (West 2020); and West Virginia classifies its LPs under its Chapter 47.
Regulation of Trade. W. VA. CODEANN. §§ 47-9-1 to 47-9-63 (West 2020).
47. Alaska classifies both its corporations and LLCs in their own chapters under its Title
10: Corporations and Associations. ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.06.005 to 10.06.995 (West 2020);
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ALASKA STAT §§ 10.50.010 to 10.50.995 (West 2020); Alaska classifies LPs under its Title
32. Partnership. ALASKA STAT. §§ 32.11.010 to 32.11.990 (West 2020). Arkansas classifies
its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Title 4. Business and Commercial Law, but further
classifies its corporations and LLCs under Subtitle 3. Corporations and Associations. ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-27-101 to 4-27-1908 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to 4-32-1401
(2007); Arkansas classifies its LPs under its Subtitle 4. Partnerships. ARK. CODEANN. §§ 4-
47-101 to 4-47-1302 (2001). Iowa classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs under its Title
XII. Business Entities, but further classifies its corporations and LLCs under its Subtitle 2.
Business and Professional Corporations and Companies. IOWACODE §§ 490.101 to 490.1703
(2020); IOWACODE §§ 489.101 to 489.1304 (2020); Iowa classifies its LPs under its Subtitle
1. Partnerships. IOWACODE§§488.101 to 488.1207 (2020). Kansas classifies its corporations
and LLCs under its Chapter 17. Corporations. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-6001 to 17-71-514
(2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7662 to 17-7617 (2020); Kansas classifies its LPs in Chapter
56. Partnerships. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-1a101 to 56-1a610 (2020). Kentucky classifies its
corporations and LLCs under its Title XXIII. Private Corporations and Associations and LPs
in Title XXIX. Commerce and Trade. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.1-010 to 271B.18-070
(1972); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001 to 275.540 (1972); Kentucky classifies its LPs in its
Title XXIX. Commerce and Trade. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.401 to 362.546 (1988).
Louisiana classifies its corporations and LLCs under its Title 12. Corporations and
Associations of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-101 to 1-1705 (2015);
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1370 (2015); Louisiana classifies its LPs [known as “partnership in
commendam”] under its Title XI of Book III. Of the Different Modes of Acquiring the
Ownership of Things. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. ART. 870 (2001). Massachusetts classifies its
corporations and LLCs under its Title XXII. Corporations. MASS. GEN. LAWSANN. CH. 156,
§§ 1-55 (2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 156C §§ 1-72; Massachusetts classifies its LPs
under Title XV. Regulation of Trade. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH 109, §§ 1-66 (2020).
Michigan classifies its corporations and LLCs under its Chapter 450. Corporations. MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 450.98-450.192 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§450.4101-450-5200 (2020);
the LLC statute is classified under “Chapter 450. Corporations.” Michigan classifies its LPs
under Chapter 449. Partnership. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 449.1101-449.2108 (2020). Nebraska
classifies its corporations and LLCs under its Chapter 21. Corporations and Other Companies.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-201 to 21-2,232 (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-101 to 21-197 (2021);
Nebraska classifies its LPs under Chapter 67. Partnerships. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-233 to 67-
2,100 (2020). New Mexico classifies its corporations and LLCs under its Chapter 53.
Corporations. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-11-1 to 53-11-51; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to 53-
19-60 (2020). New Mexico classifies its LPs under its Chapter 54. Partnerships. N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 54-sA-101 to 54-2A-1206 (2020). North Dakota classifies its corporations and LLCs
under its Title 10. Corporations. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-19-1-00.1 to 10-19.1-152 (2019);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-1-01 to 10-32.1-101 (2019); North Dakota classifies its LPs under
Title 45. Partnerships. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 45-10.2-01 to 45-10.2117 (2019). Oklahoma
classifies its corporations and LLCs under Title 18. Corporations. CENT. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18,
§§ 1001-1144 (2014); CENT. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (2014); Oklahoma classifies
its LPs in Title 54. Partnership. CENT. OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, §§ 500-101a to 500-1207a (2014).
South Dakota classifies its corporations and LLCs under its Title 47. Corporations. SD
CODIFIEDLAWS§§ 47-1a-101 to 47-1a-1703.1 (2005); South Dakota classifies LPs under Title
48. Partnerships. SDCODIFIEDLAWS §§ 48-7-101 to 48-7a-1208 (2020). Tennessee classifies
corporations and LLCs under Title 48. Corporations and Associations. TENN. CODEANN. §§
48-11-101 TO 48-27-103 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-249-101 TO 48-249-1019 (1986);
Tennessee classifies its LPs under its Title 61. Partnerships. TENN. CODEANN. §§ 61-2-101 to
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together, with their corporate statutes grouped elsewhere;48 and one state
groups its corporate statutes and its limited partnership statutes together, with
its LLC statute grouped elsewhere.49
By 1996, every state had some sort of LLC legislation, but there was
then, and continues to be now, significant variation in the scope, provisions,
61-2-1209 (1988). Virginia classifies its corporation and LLCs under its Title 13.1
Corporations. VA. CODEANN. §§ 13.1-601 TO 13.1-781 (2021); VA. CODEANN. §§ 13.1-1000
to 13.1-1099.27 (2021); Virginia classifies its LPs under Title 50. Partnerships. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-73.1 to 50-73.78 (2020). Wisconsin classifies its corporations and LLCs under
Corporations (Ch. 180 to 188). WIS. STAT. §§ 180.0101 to 180.1921 (2021); WIS. STAT. §§
183.0102 to 183.1305 (2021); Wisconsin classifies its LPs under Partnerships (Ch. 178, 179).
WIS. STAT. §§ 179.01 TO 179.94 (2021).
48. Arizona classifies its corporations under its Title 10. Corporations and Associations.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-120 to 10-1701 (1996); Arizona classifies its LLCs and LPs
under its Title 29. Partnership. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-301 to 29-373 (2020);ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to 29-858 (2020). Connecticut classifies its corporations under its Title
33. Corporations. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-600 to 33-998 (1997); Connecticut classifies its
LLCs and LPs under its Title 34. Limited Partnerships, Partnerships, Professional
Associations, Limited Liability Companies and Statutory Trusts. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 34-
243 to 34-290 (2017). Delaware classifies its corporations under its Title 8. Corporations.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (1998); Delaware classifies its LLCs and LPs under its
Title 6. Commerce and Trade. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to 18-1110 (2020); DEL.
CODEANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to 17-1111 (2020). Maine classifies its corporations under Title
13. Corporations. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 41-337 (1987); Maine classifies its LLCs
and LPs under Title 31. Partnerships and Associations. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1501-
1693 (2017); §§ 1301-1461 (2017). New Hampshire classifies its corporations under its Title
XXVII. Corporations, Associations, and Proprietors of Common Lands. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 293-a:1.01 to 293-a:17.04 (2014); New Hampshire classifies its LLCs and LPs under
its Title XXVIII. Partnerships. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-B:1 to 304-B:64 (2019); §§
304-C:1 to 304-C:201 (2013). New Jersey classifies its corporations under Title 14A.
Corporations, General. N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A §§ 1:1 to 16:4 (1988); New Jersey classifies its
LLCs and LPs under its Title 42. Partnerships and Partnership Associations. N.J. STAT. ANN.
42 §§ 2C-1 to 2C-94(2012); 42 §§ 2A-1 to 2A-73(1985). Pennsylvania classifies
corporations, LLCs and LPs under Title 15 Pa.C.S.A. Corporations and Unincorporated
Associations, and further breaks down that title into Part II Corporations and Part III.
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 501-1997 (1989); §§
8811-8885; §§ 8611-8695 (1989). Utah classifies its corporations under its Title 16.
Corporations. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 12-10a-101 to 16-10a-1804 (1992); Utah classifies its
LLCs and LPs under Title 48. Partnership – Unincorporated Business Entities. UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 48-3a-101 to 48-3a-1405; §§ 48-2e-101 to 48-2e-1205 (2014). Washington classifies
corporations under Title 23B. Washington Business Corporation Act. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 23B.01.010 to 23B.900.050 (2020); Washington classifies its LLCs and LPs under
Title 25. Partnerships. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.15.006 to 25.15.905; §§ 25.10.006 to
25.10.926 (2020).
49. Hawaii classifies its corporations and LPs in Division 2. Business under Title 23.
Corporations and Partnerships. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 414-1 to 414-484; §§ 425E-101 to 425E-
1206 (2000); Hawaii classifies its LLCs under Title 23A. Other Business Entities. HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 428-101 to 428-1302 (2010).
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applicability, and enforcement of these statutes.50 For example, virtually
every LLC statute deals with derivative litigation, but there are significant
differences in the approach and coverage of the various state statutes.51 Two
model acts were drafted in the 1990s and served as the basis, at least to some
degree, of many of these LLC statutes.52 The first of these model acts came
from the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), which describes itself as an
organization providing “non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted
legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory
law.”53 In 1994, the ULC promulgated the original Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act, blending concepts from partnership and corporate
law.54 The ULC noted that by 1994, nearly every state had adopted an LLC
statute, and those statutes varied considerably in both form and substance.55
Many of those early statutes were based on the first version of the ABA
Model Prototype LLC Act.”56 In 1996, the ULC promulgated the Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Act (RULLCA).57 Twenty one states have
50. Joseph M. Dylla, A Case for the Adoption of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act in South Dakota, 56 S.D. L. REV. 285, 286 (2011).
51. See DEMOTT, supra note 36, at § 2.11 (discussing different states’ approaches to
derivative litigation).
52. “Unfortunately, the promulgation of ULLCA did not solve the problem of variability
in LLC law, in large part because it was introduced after most jurisdictions had already
legislatively addressed LLCs.” Dylla, supra note 50, at 286.
53. About Us, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview
[https://perma.cc/VBV4-9CXL] (last visited May 15, 2020).
54. According to the ULC:
ULLCA’s drafting relied substantially on the then recently adopted Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”), and this reliance was especially heavy with
regard to member-managed LLCs. ULLCA’s provisions for manager-managed
LLCs comprised an amalgam fashioned from the 1985 Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (“RULPA”) and the Model Business Corporation Act
(“MBCA”). ULLCA’s provisions were also significantly influenced by the then-
applicable federal tax classification regulations, which classified an
unincorporated organization as a corporation if the organization more nearly
resembled a corporation than a partnership.
Prefatory Note to ULLCA (2006), UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT (2006) (Last
Amended 2011).
55. Id.
56. Id. See Part II infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Prototype Act.
57. The RULLLCA is a revision of the 1996 ULLCA. It:
permits the formation of limited liability companies (LLCs), which provide the
owners with the dual advantages of corporate-type limited liability and
partnership tax treatment. The 2011 and 2013 amendments enacted as part of the
Harmonization of Business Entity Acts project, updated and harmonized the
language in this act with similar provisions in other uniform and model
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adopted the RULLCA,58 and two additional states have introduced
legislation to do so.59 The RULLCA authorizes members to maintain
derivative actions, but also creates hurdles for such members, for example,
contemporaneous ownership.60 The concept of contemporaneous ownership
requires that the plaintiff be a member of the LLC from the time of the
complained-upon act.61 An earlier version of the RULLCA abandoned the
traditional “contemporaneous ownership” rule, instead requiring only that
plaintiff was a member at the time the action was commenced and remained
a member while the action continues.62 The basis for eliminating this hurdle
was that “the protections of that rule are unnecessary given the closely-held
nature of most limited liability companies and the built-in, statutory
restrictions on persons becoming members.”63
The RULLCA reinstated the traditional “contemporaneous ownership”
rule, again requiring that a proper plaintiff must have been a member at the
time of the complained-upon act.64 The RULLCA also requires that
plaintiffs make a demand on the managers, unless demand would be futile,65
and that the complaint states with particularity the date and content of the
plaintiff’s demand, or the reasons such a demand would have been futile.66
The RULLCA does not require plaintiffs to post security for expenses, which
may be a reason that more states have not adopted security for expense
unincorporated entity acts to enable the adoption of multiple acts in a single
statute.
Description: 2006 Limited Liability Company Act, Revised, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.u
niformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=bbea059c-6853-4f45-b69b-
7ca2e49cf740 [https://perma.cc/9963-QUSS] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
58. Alabama (2019); Arizona (2018); Pennsylvania (2017); Illinois (2016); Connecticut
(2016); North Dakota (2015); Vermont (2015); Idaho (2015); Washington (2015); Alabama
(2014); Minnesota (2014); South Dakota (2013); Florida (2013); New Jersey (2012);
California (2012); District of Columbia (2011); Utah (2011); Nebraska (2010); Wyoming
(2010); Iowa (2008); and Idaho (2008). Id.
59. H. R. AB 854, 2019 Leg., (Wis. 2019); S. R. S. 265, 123rd Gen. Assemb., (S. C.
2019).
60. REVISEDUNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITYCOMPANYACT (2006) (Last Amended 2013) §
803(2013).
61. Id. “Underlying this rule is an understandable policy: investors should not be able to
“buy” law suits, and unjust enrichment may result if the shareholder seeking recovery bought
his shares at a discounted price that already reflected the injury.” Coffee & Schwartz, supra
note 28, at 312.
62. NAT’LCONFERENCE OFCOMM’RS OFUNIF. STATE L., supra note 11, at 103.
63. Id.
64. RULLCA § 803 (2013).
65. RULLCA § 802 (2013).
66. RULLCA § 804 (2013). This differs from the corporate rule in the MBCA, which
requires “universal” demand with no futility carve out. MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42.
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provisions.
The second model act was the Prototype Limited Liability Company
Act (Prototype Act). The Prototype Act was drafted by a working group
from the American Bar Association in 1992.67 The Prototype Act does not
adopt any of the typical provisions from the RULLCA dealing with
derivative suits, since the Act does not permit derivative suits unless
provided for in the operating agreement or unless the member is authorized
to bring the action by a majority of the members eligible to consent, unless
a higher percentage is required by the operating agreement.68 A number of
67. The Prototype Act was drafted in 1992 by the Working Group on the Prototype
Limited Liability Company Act, Subcommittee on Limited Liability Companies, Committee
on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations of the Business Law Section of
the American Bar Association. RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE, supra note 5, at Appx. C, p. App
C-109. See also Saunders v. Briner, 334 Conn 135, 157–58 (2019) (recognizing that
Connecticut’s limited liability company statutory provisions were modeled after the Prototype
Act).
During the LLC “explosion” of the early 1990s, to provide guidance for the
analysis and resolution of issues involved in crafting LLC legislation, a working
group of the American Bar Association’s Committee on LLCs, Partnerships and
Unincorporated Entities (“LPUE”) drafted a “Prototype Limited Liability
Company Act” (the “Prototype Act”), which was published in November 1992.
Shortly thereafter the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (“NCCUSL”) began work on a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(“ULLCA”), which was adopted in 1994 and subsequently amended in 1995 and
1996. By the end of 1996 LLC Acts had been adopted in all of the states, in the
District of Columbia, and in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Revised Prototype LLC Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 117, 117 (2011).
A comment to the Prototype Act mentions that the Act replaces derivative suits,
noting, “The main difference between the approach of this section and a derivative suit is that
this section does not permit a single member to sue on behalf of the LLC without first being
authorized to sue by the other members.” RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE, supra note 5, at § 1102
cmt., at C-10 to-110. See also James R. Burkhard, Resolving LLC Member Disputes in
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Other States That Enacted the
Prototype LLC Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 405 (2012) (analyzing the Prototype Act provisions).
68. The Prototype provision reads:
§ 1102 AUTHORITY TO SUE ON BEHALF OF LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY
Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement, a suit on behalf of the
limited liability company may be brought only in the name of the limited liability
company by:
One or more members of a limited liability company, whether or not an operating
agreement vests management of the limited liability company in one or more
managers, who are authorized to sue by the vote of more than one half by number
of the members eligible to vote thereon, unless the vote of all members shall be
required pursuant to § 403(B), provided that in determining the vote required
under § 403, the vote of any member who has an interest in the outcome of the
suit that is adverse to the interest of the limited liability company shall be
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states adopted the Prototype Act, and in essence, rejected the notion of the
derivative litigation as a mechanism to resolve disputes among LLC
members.69 The original LLC laws in Alaska,70 Arkansas,71 Connecticut,72
Indiana,73 Kentucky,74 Massachusetts,75 New Hampshire,76 New Mexico,77
Pennsylvania,78 and Wisconsin79 were all modeled after the Prototype Act.
Several of these states have since backed away from this approach to varying
degrees. Pennsylvania originally followed the Prototype Act but has since
moved to the RULLCA.80 Kentucky is anomalous, including both the
Prototype Act language requiring the plaintiff to be authorized by a majority
excluded . . .
PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITYCOMPANYACT §1102.
69. Burkhard, supra note 67, at 409.
70. ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.735.
71. ARKANSASCODEANN. § 4-32-1102.
72. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-186 (repealed by 2016, P.A. 16-97, § 110, eff. July 1, 2017.)
73. IND. CODE § 23-18-8-1.
74. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.330; § 275.335.
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 156C, § 56.
76. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:188.
77. N.M. REV. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-58.
There is no express provision in the NewMexico Limited Liability Company Act
for member derivative suits, though the New Mexico Liability Act includes a
directive that “the principles of law and equity supplement that act, Limited
Liability Company Act for member derivative actions, including such principles
applicable to corporations and their owners.”
In re Patel, No. 7-10-12627 JA, 2012WL 908439, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.M.Mar. 16, 2012). “The
New Mexico Supreme Court has extended the scope of corporate derivative suits to
partnerships, but the NewMexico Court of Appeals has declined to decide whether derivative
suits can be brought in other, similar settings.” Id.
78. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8992 §§ 8991 to 8993. Repealed by 2016, Nov. 21, P.L. 1328,
No. 170, § 30(2), effective in 90 days [Feb. 21, 2017].
79. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.1101. In Marx v. Morris, the defendant asked the court to
read corporate principles of derivative standing into the case involving an LLC. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court declined, noting:
the absence of statutory procedures that limit actions against others for injuries
to the LLC is significant . . . we decline to import corporate principles of
derivative standing into ch. 193 to preempt claims by individual North Star
members. This conclusion is not driven by who “owns” the claim, but rather by
Wis. Stat § 183.0401 and the partnership-like mode of operation North Star, LLC
selected in its Operating Agreement.
Marx v. Morris, 386 Wis. 2d 122, 124 (2019).
80. The original statute was 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8892, which was repealed by 2016,
Nov. 21, P.L. 1328, No. 170, § 30(2), effective in 90 days [Feb. 21, 2017]; the current statute
is 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8882.
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of the eligible members,81 and also the RULLCA provision authorizing
derivative suits with the typical requirements that the plaintiff make a
demand unless futile, contemporaneous ownership, particularity in the
complaint, and that the member fairly and adequately represents the interests
of the members.82
Connecticut enacted its original LLC statute in 1993 based on the
Prototype Act (CLLCA).83 The statute was repealed in 2017 and replaced
with a version based on the RULLCA.84 In Saunders v. Briner, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut examined whether the original statute authorized a
member or manager of a limited liability company to bring a derivative
action on its behalf.85 Paradoxically, the suit had been filed in 2012, under
the original statute but was decided in 2019, after the new statute
(CULLCA)86 was in effect and would have changed the outcome for the
plaintiff. The court noted that the original CLLCA was modeled after the
Prototype Act and concluded that the Connecticut act did not permit
members or managers to file derivative actions; the act authorized members
or managers to collectively file such a suit, only as long as the requisite
majority of disinterested members or managers approved.87 The Connecticut
court was of the view that the lawmakers intentionally omitted derivative
suits by LLC members and was not inclined to undo that, even though the
revised statute did just that. According to the court:
We conclude, therefore, that, in adopting a functionally identical
provision to § 1102 of the Prototype Act, our legislature chose to
omit the derivative action under the [old] CLLCA for members
and managers of limited liability companies. Consequently, the
plaintiff in the present case failed to allege that he undertook the
proper procedure to maintain standing under the CLLCA.
Although the allegations set forth in the plaintiff’s second
amended complaint—namely, that he was a member or manager
of both companies and that either he made demands on Briner or
such demands were futile—comport with the procedural
requirements for bringing a derivative action under the [new]
CULLCA, they do not comply with the requirements for bringing
a member initiated action under the CLLCA.88
81. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.335.
82. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.337.
83. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-186 (repealed by 2016, P.A. 16-97, § 110, eff. July 1, 2017.)
84. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 271a-271e.
85. Saunders v. Briner, 334 Conn. 135 (2019).
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 271a-271e.
87. Saunders, 334 Conn. at 159-60.
88. Id. at 161-2 (citations omitted).
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The Prototype Act was revised in 2011, with revisions now providing
“an extensive set of provisions dealing with derivative actions derived from
the RMBCA and the Colorado Limited Liability Company Act.”89
Nonetheless, Alaska, Arkansas, Indiana, Massachusetts, and New Mexico
have retained the original Prototype language and do not authorize derivative
suits unless plaintiffs have the approval of a majority of the membership
interests eligible to vote.90
NewYork is a bit of an outlier here because, like the states that followed
the Prototype Act, it does not have a provision authorizing derivative suits
for LLCs, but it did not model its statute after the Prototype Act. An early
draft of the New York LLC statute did contain a provision authorizing
derivative suit against LLCs; the final iteration, however, omitted all
reference to derivative suits when it was passed in 1994.91 The background
on how, and perhaps why, derivative suits were omitted from the final statue
is discussed extensively by a closely-divided New York Court of Appeals in
Tzolis v. Wolff.92
The underlying question here is how much weight to give lawmakers’
failure to include a given topic in the statute. Does the absence of the
provision mean that the lawmakers affirmatively intended to exclude the
topic from the state’s laws generally?93 This is the position taken by the
89. Revised Prototype LLC Act, supra note 67, at 122.
90. See supra notes 70, 71, 73, 75, 77.
91. According to the New York Court of Appeals:
The Legislature clearly did decide not to enact a statute governing derivative suits
on behalf of LLCs. An Assembly-passed version of the bill that became the
Limited Liability Company Law included an article IX, entitled “Derivative
Actions.” In the Senate-passed version, and the version finally adopted, the
article was deleted, leaving a conspicuous gap; in the law as enacted, the article
following article VIII is article X. Nothing in the legislative history discusses the
omission.
Tzolis v, Wolff, 10 N.Y.3d 100, 106–07 (2008).
92. Tzolis v, Wolff, 10 N.Y.3d 100 (2008).
93. Not to the Tzolis majority: “The dissent finds, in the legislative history of the Limited
Liability Company Law, a ‘legislative bargain’ to the effect that derivative suits on behalf of
LLCs should not exist (dissenting op at 113). We find no such thing.” Tzolis, 10 N.Y.3d at
106. The Connecticut Supreme court certainly thought so in Saunders v. Briner:
Our conclusion is consistent with the context surrounding our legislature’s
enactment of the CLLCA and its enactment of our current limited liability
company statute, the Connecticut Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(CULLCA), General Statutes § 34-243 et seq. Not only did our legislature
decline to provide for a derivative cause of action in the CLLCA but, when it
enacted the CLLCA, it also did not modify our derivative action statute, General
Statutes § 52-572j, to include limited liability companies. [citations omitted].
The fact that the legislature did not modify § 52-572j after its enactment of the
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dissent in Tzolis, arguing that the right to bring a derivative action was
deleted from the final version of the bill, thus siding with the defendants and
their claim that the New York lawmakers intended to exclude LLC members
from the derivative litigation process.94
Reading the tea leaves of legislators’ unspoken intent is tricky business
at best. What if the absence of the provision was not dispositive? What if
the lawmakers’ failure to include a topic meant that while the lawmakers
affirmatively intended to exclude the topic from the statute, they also
intended that the courts step in to create case law that would deal with the
topic they omitted?95 That is the position the Tzolis majority took in holding
that LLC members were permitted to bring derivative suits on behalf of the
LLC, even without express authorization in the New York LLC statute.96
The court found that “this omission [of authorization for derivative suits]
does not imply such suits are prohibited.”97
The court acknowledged that the provision authorizing derivative suits
CLLCA suggests that it did not intend to allow derivative actions for that type of
corporate structure.
Saunders v. Briner, 334 Conn. 135, 161 n.27 (2019).
94. According to the Tzolis dissent:
Presumably, those businesses electing to organize as LLCs relied on what the
Limited Liability Company Law says, and counted on the New York judiciary to
interpret the statute as written. Instead, the majority has effectively rewritten the
law to add a right that the Legislature deliberately chose to omit. For a Court that
prides itself on resisting any temptation to usurp legislative prerogative, the
outcome of this appeal is curious. I respectfully dissent.
Tzolis, 10N.Y.3d at 121 (Read, J., dissenting). A lower NewYork court shared Justice Read’s
concerns in Lio v. Zhong:
When the Limited Liability Company Law was enacted in New York State in
1994 a conscious decision was made to eliminate the right of its individual
members to bring derivative actions. Prior drafts of the bill had included such a
right, but such provisions were eliminated as a means of getting the bill passed.
The omission of such provision has created controversy, particularly where, as
here, allegations are made that those in control are acting contrary to the interests
of the other members of the LLC.
Lio v. Zhong, 10 Misc.3d 1068(A) at 3 (2006).
95. The majority in Tzolis did not find this omission to be meaningfully indicative of
legislative intention, suggesting that legislators may have expected only that “the problem
would cease to be the Legislature’s and become the courts.” DEMOTT, supra note 36, at §
2:11.
96. Tzollis, 10 N.Y.3d at 102. The court based its holding “on the long-recognized
importance of the derivative suit in corporate law and on the absence of evidence that the
Legislature decided to abolish this remedy when it passed the Limited Liability Company
Law in 1994.” Id. at 103.
97. Id.
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had been inserted and then removed from the bill, but found that “this does
not prove that any legislator, much less the Legislature as a whole, thought
that the absence of article IX would render derivative suits nonexistent—an
extreme result that no legislator is known to have favored.”98 The dissent
relies on the removal of the provision from the final bill to support its
conclusion that the lawmakers intended that derivative suits for LLC
members were not authorized in New York.99 The Court of Appeals
disagreed, noting that “the dissent cites to no evidence, and we know of none,
that anyone ever suggested doing away with derivative suits entirely.”100 The
98. Tzolis, 10 N.Y.3d at 108. According to the majority:
Our only source of information on the reason for it is a sentence written by the
author of the Practice Commentaries on the Limited Liability Company Law:
“Because some legislators had raised questions about the derivative rights
provisions, to avoid jeopardizing passage of the balance of the entire law, Article
IX was dropped” (Rich, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY,
Book 32/32A, Limited Liability Company Law, at 181 [2007]). Nothing tells us
what the “questions” were, or why they would have jeopardized the bill’s
passage.”
Id. at 107.
99. According to the Tzolis dissent:
The enacting (not a subsequent) Legislature considered and explicitly rejected
language authorizing the very result that plaintiffs have successfully sought from
the judiciary in this case. Fourteen years after the fact the majority has unwound
the legislative bargain. The proponents of derivative rights for LLC members—
who were unable to muster a majority in the Senate—have now obtained from
the courts what they were unable to achieve democratically. Thanks to judicial
fiat, LLC members now enjoy the right to bring a derivative suit. And because
created by the courts, this right is unfettered by the prudential safeguards against
abuse that the Legislature has adopted when opting to authorize this remedy in
other contexts (see Business Corporation Law §§ 626, 627; Partnership Law §§
115-a, 115-b).
Id. at 121 (Read, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 107.
But this does not prove that any legislator, much less the Legislature as a whole,
thought that the absence of article IX would render derivative suits nonexistent—
an extreme result that no legislator is known to have favored. We simply do not
know what consequences the legislators expected to follow from the omission. It
is possible that some legislators did expect—though no one expressed the
expectation—that there would be no derivative suits. It is possible that some
legislators expected the courts to follow the established case law, and to recognize
derivative suits in the absence of a “clear mandate against” doing so (Klebanow,
344 F2d at 298); one witness at a legislative public hearing did express that
expectation (statement of Howard N. Lefkowitz, chair of Committee on
Corporation Law, Association of Bar of City of NY, Transcript of Assembly
Public Hearing on Limited Liability Company Legislation, June 11, 1992, at
133). It is possible that the Senate expected one thing, and the Assembly the
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court points to what it considered to be the most salient feature of the
legislative history, commenting that “no one, in or out of the Legislature,
ever expressed a wish to eliminate, rather than limit or reform, derivative
suits.”101
The court looked to other forms of business for guidance and noted that
derivative suits for shareholders had long been recognized in New York case
law102 and later by statute.103 Derivative suits had only recently been
considered in New York for other forms of business such as limited partners,
even in the absence of statutory authorization.104 The court cited a Second
Circuit Court of Appeals case holding that “the absence of a statutory
provision was not decisive because the court found no ‘clear mandate against
limited partners’ capacity to bring an action like this.’”105 As a result, the
court noted that in the instant case, it would not “readily conclude that the
Legislature intended to set us on this uncharted path” to “abolish[] the
derivative suit as far as LLCs are concerned.”106
The dissent raised a valid additional concern that a judicial
authorization of derivative suits in blank would thereby not subject the
process to any of the typical procedural hurdles, such as requiring a demand
other. It is even possible that neither expected anything, except that the problem
would cease to be the Legislature’s and become the courts’. The legislative
history is, in short, far too ambiguous to permit us to infer that the Legislature
intendedwholly to eliminate, in the LLC context, a basic, centuries-old protection
for shareholders, leaving the courts to devise some new substitute remedy.
Id. at 108.
101. Id. at 106.
102. According to Justice Smith:
Chancellor Walworth recognized the remedy [of derivative suits] in Robinson v
Smith (3 Paige Ch 222 [1832]),because he thought it essential for shareholders
to have recourse when those in control of a corporation betrayed their duty.
Chancellor Walworth applied to a joint stock corporation—then a fairly new kind
of entity—a familiar principle of the law of trusts: that a beneficiary (or “cestui
que trust”) could bring suit on behalf of a trust when a faithless trustee refused to
do so.
Id. at 103.
103. N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 626.
104. Query whether the lower court truly understood the nature of the LLC entity; the
procedural posture of the case reflects the confusion that some courts have about LLCs in
general, and specifically, with respect to derivative suits. The Supreme Court of the New
York Country initially dismissed the case, finding the plaintiffs could not bring action “to
redress the wrongs suffered by the corporation.” Tzolis v. Wolff, 12 Misc.3d 1151(A), 2006
N.Y. Slip Op. 50851 (U). It is worth mentioning that an LLC is not a corporation.
105. Tzolis, 10 N.Y.3d at 104 (citing Klebanow v. N.Y. Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d
Cir. 1965)).
106. Id. at 106.
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and contemporaneous ownership, and would leave the right to derivative
suits “unfettered by the prudential safeguards against abuse that the
Legislature has adopted . . . in other contexts.”107 The majority disagreed
with the characterization of derivative suits as “unfettered,” relying on
existing restrictions in the caselaw on shareholder derivative suits which,
presumably, would now be applied in the context of LLCs.108 The court
ultimately punts on this issue, saying “what limitations on the right of LLC
members to sue derivatively may exist is a question not before us today. We
do not, however, hold or suggest that there are none,” leaving the door open
for judges in future cases or lawmakers to promulgate any needed procedural
hurdles.109
C. Derivative Litigation by Limited Partners
Limited partnerships also blend features of corporations and
partnerships, so it is again unsurprising that drafters have leaned on both
corporate and partnership statutory norms in crafting structures to govern
this hybrid.110 As is the case with LLC legislation, almost every state now
authorizes limited partners to bring derivative suits on behalf of the limited
partnership.111 This result reflects that, in the context of derivative suits, the
limited partnership is arguably acting more like a corporation than a
partnership. A limited partner with no right to manage or control the entity,
and no power to bind the entity, faces much the same challenges as a
shareholder would when trying to hold managers accountable.112 Both
107. Id. at 108 (citing Read, J., dissenting at 121).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 108–09.
110. Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COL. L. REV. 1463, 1478 (1965).
111. Louisiana is the exception. Limited partnerships in Louisiana are called
“Partnerships in Commendam,” and there is no mention of derivative suits for this form of
business. LA. CIV. CODEANN. art. 2837–42.
112. “Limited partners, like corporate shareholders, traditionally have little or no
management power. Indeed, the limited partner ‘control’ rule, which was ubiquitous in
limited partnerships as of the adoption of the initial LLC statutes, makes non-participation in
control a condition of limited liability.” Ribstein, supra note 4, at 747.
The courts have offered protection to limited partners even without statutory rights to bring
derivative suits, relying on an analogy with the law of trusts:
There can be no question that a managing or general partner of a limited
partnership is bound in a fiduciary relationship with the limited partners . . . and
the latter are, therefore, cestuis que trustent. . . . It is fundamental to the law of
trusts that cestuis have the right, ‘upon the general principles of equity’
(Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 232) and ‘independently of [statutory]
provisions’ (Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52, 59), to sue for the benefit of
the trust on a cause of action which belongs to the trust if ‘the trustees refuse to
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groups of owners are, for the most part, at the mercy of their managers.113
The liability exposure of limited partners and shareholders is also
comparable; the limited partners’ liability is limited to their capital
contribution and, assuming proper behavior on their part, the limited partners
have no personal liability for partnership debts or obligations.114 This is true
for corporate shareholders who behave properly as well. Thus, it is
unsurprising that courts have explicitly relied on corporate precedents when
exploring demand futility in the case of limited partnerships.115 The
arguments made against permitting derivative suits in closely-held LLCs are
not as strong in the case of limited partners, since limited partners, by
definition, have no right to manage.116
As it did with limited liability companies, the ULC promulgated a
model act for limited partnerships; the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(2001) (ULPA) was promulgated in 2001 and was last revised in 2013.117
According to the ULC, it was drafted to provide “a more flexible and stable
basis for the organization of limited partnership, helping states stimulate new
perform their duty in that respect’. (Western R. R. Co. v. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513,
518 . . . .).
Tzolis, 10 N.Y.3d at 104–05.
113. According to Professor DeMott, “the limited partner’s relationship to the limited
partnership is sufficiently analogous to a shareholder’s relationship to a corporation to justify
derivative actions.” DEMOTT, supra note 36, at § 2:11.
114. For a discussion of piercing the corporate veil and the liability of LLC members for
LLC debts and obligations, see Albert, supra note 13.
115. “In the absence of legislation explicitly authorizing limited partners to bring
derivative actions, most courts considering the question held that limited partners were able
to bring such actions as beneficiaries or cestuis que trustent of a fiduciary relationship with
the limited partnership itself.” DEMOTT, supra note 36, § 2:11. See also Seaford Funding
Ltd. P’ship v. M&M Assocs. II, L.P., 672 A.2d 66 (Del. Ch. 1995) (applying Delaware
corporate standards and principles in analyzing whether demand had been excused in a
derivative suit brought against a limited partnership and holding that “demand futility issues
in the partnership context are the same as in the corporate context.); Gubitosi v. Zegeye, 28
F. Supp. 2d 298, 306–07 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (applying Pennsylvania corporate law to a limited
partnership case).
116. Ribstein, supra note 4.
117. According to Professor Kleinberger:
The “shelf life” on uniform entity acts seems to be decreasing. The original
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) lasted eight decades, and the original Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA (1916)) lasted six. In contrast, the 1976 Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA (1976)) warranted major revisions
after just nine years (RULPA (1985)), and only sixteen years later NCCUSL
recommended to the states that they adopt ULPA (2001) to replace RULPA in
toto.
Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 37
SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 583 (2004).
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partnership business ventures.”118 The current ULPA includes provisions
from prior versions and a number of provisions from the ULLCA, including
authorizing limited partners to bring derivative suits.119 The ULPA has been
enacted in 23 states and the District of Columbia,120 and there is a bill pending
in Wisconsin to adopt the act.121
The UPLA has some overlaps, but also significant departures, from
another model act, the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). The
MBCA requires contemporaneous ownership122 and so does the ULPA.123
But there are differences between the ULPA and the MBCA in the area of
derivative suits. The MBCA requires that the plaintiff must fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the corporation in enforcing its rights,124
but the ULPA does not. The MBCA requires “universal” demand with no
carve out for demand futility;125 but the ULPA provides an exception to the
demand requirement where demand would be futile.126
The MBCA does not require derivative plaintiffs to provide security for
expenses; neither does the ULPA. Nonetheless, a handful of states require
118. Limited Partnership Act, Revised Description, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.unifor
mlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=d9036976-6c90-4951-ba81-104
6c90da035 [https://perma.cc/7F8B-63CW] (last visited May 15, 2020). The ULPA was
promulgated in 2001 and last amended in 2013. It takes the place of the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, which was promulgated in 1976 and last amended in 1985.
119. UNIF. LIM. P’SHIPACT § 902 (2001).
120. Alabama (2019); Pennsylvania (2017); Tennessee (2017); Idaho (2015); Mississippi
(2015); District of Columbia (2011); Montana (2011); Utah (2011); Oklahoma (2010);
Washington (2009); Alabama (2009); Arkansas (2007); NewMexico (2007); Nevada (2007);
California (2006); Kentucky (2006); Maine (2006); Idaho (2006); North Dakota (2005);
Florida (2005); Iowa (2004); Illinois (2004); Minnesota (2004); Hawaii (2003). UNIF. L.
COMM’N, supra note 118.
121. The Wisconsin Bill Number is AB 854/SB 810. Id.
122. MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41(1) (2016).
123. A derivative action to enforce the right of a limited partnership may be maintained
only by a person that is a partner at the time the action is commenced. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIPACT
§§ 1002-03 (2001). California provides an exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule
for partners who can show:
(1) there is a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of
the partnership, (2) no other similar action has been or is likely to be instituted,
(3) the plaintiff acquired the shares before there was disclosure to the public and
to the plaintiff of the wrongdoing of which plaintiff complains, (4) unless the
action can be maintained the defendant may retain a gain derived from the
defendant’s willful breach of a fiduciary duty, and (5) the requested relief will
not result in unjust enrichment of the partnership or any partner.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 15910.03 (West 2014).
124. MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 (2016).
125. MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2016).
126. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIPACT § 1002 (2001).
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derivative shareholders to post a bond before filing suit, and an even smaller
number of states require this of limited partners.127 Professor Ribstein argues
that these security for expense provisions are designed “to deal with the
problem of nominal shareholders whose lawyers are essentially striking for
attorneys’ fees.”128 As a result, statutes authorizing derivative suits for LLC
members may be less necessary when the plaintiff is a significant
shareholder and not just a proxy for the lawyers. Accordingly, the statutes
may be significantly less necessary for LLC derivative suits because the
plaintiff is likely to be a major owner rather than a nominal holder “fronting”
for a lawyer.
To the extent that LLCs and limited partnerships are similar to
corporations with respect to how owners can seek to hold the entity’s
managers accountable, derivative litigation should be, and for the most part
is, appropriately available beyond just the scope of corporation to include the
equally “helpless” owners of LLCs and limited partnerships.
III. SECURITY FOR EXPENSE PROVISIONS FOR SHAREHOLDERS, LLC
MEMBERS, AND LIMITED PARTNERS
Security for expense statutes require unsuccessful derivative plaintiffs
to pay some or all of the defendants’ expenses, including in some cases,
attorney’s fees.129 The statutes typically provide that substantial owners need
not post a bond. Arguably, these substantial owners are more invested in the
firm, both literally and figuratively, and thus less likely to bring a nuisance
or strike suit that will waste corporate time, energy, and funds.
Since the first security for expense statute was enacted in New York in
127. For a discussion of the states that do impose security for expense provisions on
limited partners, see infra Part III.A.
128. RIBSTEIN&KEATINGE, supra note 5, § 13:9.
129.
Most security-for-expenses statutes provide that the security amount may include
the expenses not only of the defendant corporation, but also of other named
defendants, such as directors and officers, for which the corporation may become
liable. Thus, even when the statute does not provide so expressly, it must be read
in conjunction with the corporate indemnification statute that will govern whether
an individual defendant’s expenses will or may ultimately become expenses of
the corporation.
LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at § 3:3.
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1944, a number of other states have followed suit.130 Currently, nine states131
require shareholders to provide security for the expenses of a derivative suit:
Alaska,132 Arkansas,133 California,134 Colorado,135 Nevada,136 New Jersey,137
New York,138 North Dakota,139 and Pennsylvania.140 It is noteworthy that
Delaware, where significant, large multinational corporations are
incorporated, does not have a security for expense provision.141 A number
of states enacted, and then repealed, security for expense provisions,142
including Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine,143 Maryland,144 Nebraska, New
130. For a discussion of the history of the early security for expense statutes, see Albert
supra note 3. Professor Galanti noted the Wood Report’s “clear anti-shareholder bias” and
“its confidence in the security for expense device as the exclusive safeguard against abusive
practices in shareholder derivative litigation.” PAUL J. GALANTI, INDIANA PRACTICE SERIES:
BUSINESSORGANIZATIONS § 38.25 (2020).
131. The nine states do not include North Carolina, which in 1995, adopted a security for
expense statute applicable only to derivative suits against directors of public corporations:
If the court orders, [plaintiffs must] execute and deposit with the clerk of court a
written undertaking with sufficient surety, approved by the court, to indemnify
the corporation against any and all expenses reasonably expected to be incurred
by the corporation in connection with the proceeding, including expenses arising
by way of indemnity.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-48(3) (West 1995).
132. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.435(h) (West 2017).
133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c) (West 2018). The statute is superseded in part by
ARK. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
134. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c)-(d) (West 2014).
135. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-107-402(3) (West 1994).
136. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.520 (LexisNexis 1997).
137. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.8 (West 2013).
138. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2018).
139. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-86(2) (1997).
140. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1782 (2016).
141. DEMOTT, supra note 36, at § 3:2.
142. DEMOTT, supra note 36, at § 3:2.
143. Maine deleted its security for expense provision in 1973. Douglas M. Branson, The
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance and the Derivative Action: A
View from the Other Side, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399, 404 n.30 (citing Historical Note to
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. A. CONS. STAT. tit. 13-A § 627 (1981)).
144. The Maryland statute no longer appears in its statutes but is reproduced in Security
for Expenses Legislation Summary:
In any action instituted or maintained in the right of any foreign or domestic
corporation by the holder or holders of less than five percentum of the outstanding
shares of any class of such corporation’s stock or voting trust certificates, unless
the shares or voting trust certificates held by such holder or holders have a market
value in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars, the corporation in whose right
such action is brought shall be entitled at any stage of the proceedings before final
judgment to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees, which may be incurred by it in connection
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Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas,145 Washington, Wisconsin,146 and
Wyoming.147 The case law flowing from these nine corporate statutes is
with such action, and which may be incurred by the other parties defendant in
connection therewith for which it may in anywise become legally liable, to which
the corporation shall have recourse in such amount as the court having
jurisdiction shall determine upon termination of such action. The amount of such
security may thereafter from time to time be increased or decreased in the
discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such action upon a showing that the
security provided has or may become inadequate or excessive.
Security for Expenses Legislation Summary, supra note 17, at 268 n.5 (citing MD. ANN. CODE
GEN. LAWS art. 16, § 195 (Cum. Supp. 1947)).
145. Texas’ Business Organization Code had a security for expense provision that was
effective from January 1, 2006 to August 31, 2019:
§ 153.404. Security for Expenses of Defendants
(a) In a derivative action, the court may require the plaintiff to give security for
the reasonable expenses incurred or expected to be incurred by a defendant in the
action, including reasonable attorney’s fees.
(b) The court may increase or decrease at any time the amount of the security on
a showing that the security provided is inadequate or excessive.
(c) If a plaintiff is unable to give security, the plaintiff may file an affidavit in
accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d) Except as provided by Subsection (c), if a plaintiff fails to give the security
within a reasonable time set by the court, the court shall dismiss the suit without
prejudice.
(e) The court, on final judgment for a defendant and on a finding that suit was
brought without reasonable cause against the defendant, may require the plaintiff
to pay reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, to the
defendant, regardless of whether security has been required.
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODEANN. § 153.404. (West 2009). As of August 31, 2019, § 153.404 has
been “updated” and is now titled, “Determination by Independent Persons,” and focuses on
how to proceed on allegations made in a demand. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.404
(West 2019).
146. The Wisconsin statute no longer appears in its statutes, but is reproduced in Security
for Expenses Legislation Summary:
[N]o stockholders’ derivative action against one or more directors or officers of
a corporation of this state shall be maintained by the holder or holders of less than
5 per cent of the outstanding stock of any class, unless the action be based on
conduct which results, and is willfully intended to result, in a direct or indirect
personal benefit or advantage to one or more directors or officers, or conduct
which results in a personal benefit or advantage to one or more stockholders over
the other stockholders.
Security for Expenses Legislation Summary, supra note 17, at 271 n.17 (citing WIS. STAT. §
180:13(3) (1949)).
147. “Georgia’s General Assembly deleted the security for expense provision contained
in its statute authorizing derivative actions. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-123 (Comment). Maine
repealed its security for expense statute in 1973. ME. REV. CODE ANN tit. 13-A §
627 (Historical Note).” DEMOTT, supra note 36, at § 3:2.
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sparse in terms of number, scope, and significance, except that early
litigation in the area of security for expense provisions supported the
constitutionality of these statutes.148
This Part will briefly explore the nine current security for expense
statutes, and then explore these states’ choices whether to legislate in this
area for LLCmembers and limited partners. Ideally, this examination would
lead to consistent results or plausible reasons for the differences in
approaches to security for expense statutes for plaintiffs from LLCs and
limited partnerships.149
Most of the security for expense statutes are based, to some degree, on
Section 49 of the Model Business Corporation Act:
In any action now pending or hereafter instituted or maintained in
the right of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or
holders of record of less than five per cent of the outstanding
shares of any class of such corporation or of voting trust
certificates therefor, unless the shares or voting trust certificates so
held have a market value in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars,
the corporation in whose right such action is brought shall be
entitled at any time before final judgment to require the plaintiff
or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses, including
fees of attorneys, that may be incurred by it in connection with
such action or may be incurred by other parties named as
defendant for which it may become legally liable. Market value
shall be determined as of the date that the plaintiff institutes the
action or, in the case of an intervenor, as of the date that he
becomes a party to the action. The amount of such security may
from time to time be increased or decreased, in the discretion of
the court, upon showing that the security provided has or may
become inadequate or is excessive. The corporation shall have
recourse to such security in such amount as the court having
jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination of such action,
whether or not the court finds the action was brought without
148. In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Supreme Court
held that security for expense statues do not violate either the due process or equal protection
clauses of the Constitution, although these statutes clearly can result in different treatment for
different plaintiffs, depending on their shareholdings. At least one state case raised
constitutional grounds to set aside a security for expense statute: in Moran v. MurtaughMiller
Meyer & Nelson, LLP, 152 P.3d 416 (Cal. 2007) (holding the security for expense provision
constitutional, even though plaintiff argued that the requirement to post such security
discriminated against the plaintiffs of “modest means”).
149. For a full discussion of each of the nine states’ security for expense statutes, see
Albert, supra note 3.
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reasonable cause.150
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act omits any provision
consistent with § 49 but “provides instead that on termination of an action
the court may require plaintiff to pay defendants’ reasonable expenses, if the
court finds the proceeding was brought ‘without reasonable cause.’”151 This
may start to explain why so few states have actually enacted and retained
these security for expense provisions.152
These nine bond posting statutes have much in common and are
consistent in structure. Each statute authorizes defendants in derivative suits
to seek a court order to require derivative plaintiffs to post a bond to secure
the defendants’ litigation expenses before the case can proceed, unless the
plaintiff meets any relevant statutory carve-out based on percentage and/or
market value of their ownership interest. The range of minimum share value
needed to avoid the bond posting requirement runs from $25,000 for
Arkansas, Colorado and North Dakota, to $250,000 for New Jersey.153 The
amount of the bond is set by the court, with California being the only state
to cap the dollar amount of the bond at a maximum of $50,000, regardless of
the number of defendants.154 Most of the current security for expense statutes
go beyond simply requiring the bond and also create potential liability for
the full amount of a successful corporation’s costs and expenses, including,
in some cases, attorney’s fees.155 California and Nevada permit a court in its
discretion to require any derivative plaintiff to provide security, regardless
of their stock ownership.156
Lawmakers in these nine states likely had concerns about strike or
nuisance suits brought by spurious shareholders. The presumed aim of these
statutes is to filter out nuisance or strike suits, allowing only the meritorious
suits to move forward.157 These states’ concerns, for the most part,
150. MODELBUS. CORP. ACTANN. § 49 (1971).
151. DEMOTT, supra note 36, at § 3:2; MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 7.46(2). See also Elliott
Goldstein & Robert W. Hamilton, The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 38 BUS.
LAW. 1019, 1022 (1983) (stating that the provision developed by the Committee “encourages
the court to assess the costs of litigation against the plaintiff if the suit was commenced
without reasonable cause”).
152. “The trend, then, appears to be away from security requirements and toward reliance
on other safeguards against strike suits.” DEMOTT, supra note 36, at § 3:2.
153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-107-402 (West
1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-86(2) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.8 (West 2013).
154. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 2014).
155. GALANTI, supra note 130, at § 38.25.
156. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c) (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.520 (LexisNexis
1997).
157. See DEMOTT, supra note 36, at § 3.1 (“It was originally believed that these statutes
would deter baseless derivative suits.”).
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seemingly were limited to primarily shareholders. Of these nine states, four
states have no security for expense provision for either their LLC or limited
partnership statutes;158 none of the nine states have such a provision for just
their LLC statute; three states have such a provision for just their limited
partnership statute;159 and two states have such a provision for both their LLC
and their limited partnership statutes.160 This Part reviews the legislative
choices these nine states made on whether and how to extend their concern
about specious derivative suits to their LLC and limited partnership statutes.
A. Security for Expense Provisions for LLC Members and Limited
Partners in the Nine States Where Shareholders Must Post a Bond
1. States Adopting Security for Expense Provisions Only for
Corporate Shareholders
Alaska, Arkansas, Nevada and North Dakota all have security for
expense statutes for their shareholders but no such provisions for their LLC
members or limited partners.161 An evaluation of how these states organize
their various business entity statutes offers no conclusive insights into why
this is so. Alaska and North Dakota each classify their corporate and LLC
statutes under one title, and their limited partnership statute under another.162
This supports the notion that lawmakers in those states consider LLCs to be
more like corporations than partnerships. If this is so, arguably the LLC
members should also be required to post a bond before filing a derivative
suit. However, Arkansas and Nevada each classify their corporate, LLC, and
limited partnership statutes all under the same title, eliminating the
158. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.435(h) (West 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c) (West
1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.520 (West 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-86(2) (West
2007).
159. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3) (West 1994); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.8 (West
2013); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627(e) (McKinney 2018).
160. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c) (West 2014); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1782 (West 2016).
161. Since the Alaska and Arkansas statutes are modeled after the Prototype Act, neither
has a provision authorizing derivative suits for LLC members, thus obviating the need for a
bond posting statute. See Part II, supra.
162. Alaska classifies both its corporations and LLCs in their own chapters under its Title
10: Corporations and Associations. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.06.005 to 10.06.995;(2017)
(classifying corporations); §§ ; 10.50.010 to 10.50.995 (classifying LLCs). Alaska classifies
LPs under its Title 32: Partnership. §§ 32.11.010 to 32.11.990. North Dakota classifies its
corporations and LLCs under its Title 10. Corporations. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-19-1-00.1
to 10-19.1-152, 10-32-1-01 to 10-32.1-101. North Dakota classifies its LPs under Title 45.
Partnerships. §§ 45-10.2-01 to 45-10.2117.
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possibility of any inference about how these lawmakers view the LLC.163 A
brief examination of the four state shareholder derivative suits and a
comparison to their LLC statutes also sheds no light on the reasons why these
four states chose only to require security for expenses from shareholders and
not limited partners.
(a) Alaska
Alaska has a security for expense statute for corporate shareholders,
enacted in 1988,164 but does not have such a provision for LLC members or
limited partners.165 The Alaska LLC statute was modeled after the Prototype
Act and thus has no provision for derivative actions for members at all,166
even though such suits are statutorily authorized for both shareholders167 and
163. Arkansas classifies its corporations, LLCs, and LPs all under its Title 4. Business and
Commercial Law, but further classifies its corporations and LLCs under Subtitle 3.
Corporations and Associations. ARK. CODEANN. §§ 4-27-101 to 4-27-1908; §§ 4-32-101 to
4-32-1401. Arkansas classifies its LPs under its Subtitle 4. Partnerships. ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-47-101 to 4-47-13020. Nevada classifies corporations, LLCs, and LPs under Title 7.
Business Associations; Securities; Commodities. NEV. REV. STAT. CODE §§ 78.010-78.785;
§§ 86.011-86.590; §§ 87A.005-87A.230.
164. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.435(h) (2017).
165. Since there is no statutory provision authorizing derivative suits for LLC members,
it follows that there is no security for expense statute for members. Rule 23.1 of Alaska’s
Rules of Civil Procedure contains additional guidance regarding derivative suits, but its scope
is simply any “holder of shares of the corporation.” It does not include members of
unincorporated associations the way Arkansas’ and Colorado’s do. Rule 23.1(f) restates the
bond posting requirements from ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.435(h):
(f) In a case in which demand on the board is excused under (c) of this section or
the decision of the board under (e) of this section is rejected by the court as
inconsistent with the directors’ duties of care and loyalty to the corporation, a
plaintiff who has standing under (b) of this section shall have the right to
commence or continue the action created by (a) of this section. Notwithstanding
(c) or (e) of this section, disinterested, noninvolved directors acting as the board
or a duly charged board committee may petition the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s
action on grounds that in their independent, informed business judgment the
action is not in the best interests of the corporation. The petitioners shall have
the burden of establishing to the satisfaction of the court their disinterest,
independence from any direct or indirect control of defendants in the action, and
the informed basis on which they have exercised their asserted business
judgment. If the court is satisfied that the petitions are disinterested, independent,
and informed it shall then exercise an independent appraisal of the plaintiff’s
action to determine whether, considering the welfare of the corporation and
relevant issues of public policy, it should dismiss the action.
ALASKAR. CIV. P. 23.1.
166. See supra notes 67-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Prototype Act.
167. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.435(a) (2017).
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limited partners.168 The legislative choice not to include a statutory provision
authorizing derivative suits for LLC members obviates the need for a
security for expense statute for members of LLCs.
Alaska’s corporate security for expense provision applies to any
derivative plaintiffs holding less than five percent of any class of the
corporation’s stock.169 Alaska is unusual in that its statute focuses only on
the percentage ownership and does not provide an alternate metric for
stockholders owning stock in excess of some stated financial value. As is
common in these statutes, the court has discretion to change the amount of
the bond upon a showing that the amount of security has become inadequate
or excessive.170 Since there is no statutory provision authorizing derivative
suits for LLCmembers, it follows that there is no security for expense statute
for members. Rule 23.1 of Alaska’s Rules of Civil Procedure contains
additional guidance regarding derivative suits, but its scope is simply any
“holder of shares of the corporation.”171
The absence of the bond posting language in the limited partnership
statute is not likely explained by differences in the structure of the two
statutes; the corporate and limited partnership statutes are very similar in
construction, with one exception. Both statutes require contemporaneous
ownership, so the plaintiff must have been a shareholder or limited partner,
as appropriate, at the time of the complained-upon act.172 Both statutes
require that the plaintiff state with particularity the efforts made to secure
initiation of the action by the entity.173 The only structural difference
between the two is that the corporate statute requires a plaintiff to make a
formal demand, unless grounds exist for excusing such a demand,174 while
the limited partnership statute does not require a demand. This does not
explain the lack of bond posting statutes to stem the flow of spurious
derivative litigation. Arguably, the lack of a demand requirement might
make it more likely, not less likely, that a plaintiff would file a spurious suit.
The case law referencing the Alaska security for expense statute does
not offer any explanation for the absence of a security for expense provision
in the Alaska limited partnership laws. The only cases that reference the
statute at all do not discuss the security for expense requirement other than
168. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 32.11.490 (2017). See supra notes 67-90 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Prototype Act.
169. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.435(h) (2017).
170. Id.
171. Alaska’s Rule 23.1 does not include members of unincorporated associations the way
Arkansas and Colorado do. ALASKAR. CIV. P. 23.1.
172. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.435(b); § 32.11.500 (2017).
173. Id. § 10.06.435(d); § 32.11.510.
174. Id. § 10.06.435(c).
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to note that it had not been satisfied, and that thus, the suits in question should
be dismissed.175 So, certain shareholders are required to post a bond in
Alaska, while LLC members and limited partners are not.
(b) Arkansas
Arkansas has a security for expense statute for corporate shareholders,
enacted in 1965,176 but does not have such a provision for LLC members or
limited partners. The Arkansas LLC statute was modeled after the Prototype
Act,177 and thus has no provision for derivative actions for members at all,178
even though such suits are statutorily authorized for both shareholders179 and
175. In Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736 (Alaska 2003), shareholders brought a derivative
action against directors after the state issued a certificate of involuntary dissolution. The
lower court dismissed the case as moot following the reinstatement of the corporation and
shareholders meeting, denied shareholder’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, and awarded
attorney’s fees to the directors. The shareholders did not make a pre-suit demand and did not
establish demand excusal as required by the statute. The Alaska Supreme Court, however,
did not use the security for expense statute in its analysis and instead focused on determining
who was a “prevailing party” to be awarded attorney’s fees under Civil Rule 82. Because the
shareholders failed to satisfy the statutory standard for a derivative action thereunder, the
defendant directors were deemed to be the prevailing parties, but the plaintiffs did not have
to make a demand under the security for expense statute since the derivative suit was not
going forward.
In Holmes v. Wolf, No. S–13641, 2011 WL 6046407 (Alaska Nov. 30, 2011), the
court dismissed the derivative claim when the shareholders failed to file the required bond;
the case proceeded with only the shareholders’ claims against the three directors directly. The
Alaska Supreme Court did not address the Alaska security for expense statute in its analysis.
In Ivy v. Calais Co., No. 3AN-07-08813CI, 2008 WL 9337985 (Alaska Super. May
5, 2008), the court dismissed plaintiff’s derivative action for failing to meet the procedural
requirements of the Civil Rule 23.1 and AS § 10.06.435. The order did not specify which
procedural requirements were not met, but the court did allow the plaintiff an opportunity to
refile. The second amended complaint filed by plaintiff alleged that the aggrieved
shareholders owned 6.25 percent of the company’s shares and 18.75 percent of the company’s
assets. These ownership levels make it unlikely that the security for expense statute was even
part of the reasoning for dismissing the case. Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 24, Ivy v.
Calais Co., No. 3AN-07-08813CI, 2008 WL 9337985 (Alaska Super. May 5, 2008).
176. ARK. CODEANN. § 4-26-714(c) (2018). The statute is superseded in part by ARK. R.
CIV. P. 23.1 Actions by Shareholders.
177. Since there is no statutory provision authorizing derivative suits for LLC members,
it follows that there is no security for expense statute for members.
178. LLC members’ rights to sue derivatively are picked up in Rule 23.1 of the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets out rules for derivative suits by shareholders and
members of any unincorporated association, which by definition includes LLCs. ARK. R.CIV.
P. 23.1 (providing for suit by one or more shareholders).
179. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c)(8) (2018) (authorizing shareholder derivative
suits for corporations incorporated before 1987); see also id. § 4-27-740 (authorizing
shareholder derivative suits for corporations incorporated after 1987).
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limited partners.180 The legislative choice not to include a statutory provision
authorizing derivative suits for LLC members obviates the need for a
security for expense statute for members of LLCs.
Arkansas’ corporate security for expense provision applies to any
derivative plaintiff owning less than five percent of any class of the
corporation’s stock and $25,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.181 There
is no fixed dollar cap for the amount of the bond, which like the bond
required under the Alaska statute, can “from time to time be increased or
decreased in the discretion of the court upon a showing that the security
provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.”182
Arkansas actually has two corporate statutes, one applicable to
corporations incorporated before 1987183 and one applicable to corporations
incorporated from 1987 and after.184 The derivative suits procedures in the
two statutes both require contemporaneous ownership.185 The newer statute
requires that the plaintiff state with particularity the efforts made to obtain
action by the board of directors.186 The most significant difference between
the two statutes with respect to derivative suits is that the security for expense
provision appears only in the older statute. This would arguably support the
conclusion that security is not required for derivative plaintiffs suing a
corporation incorporated in 1987 or later, and that the Arkansas lawmakers
made an affirmative choice to prohibit derivative suits.187
180. See ARK. CODE ANN § 4-47-1002 (2018) (authorizing limited partner derivative
suits).
181. ARK. CODEANN. § 4-26-714(c)(1) (West 2018).
182. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(7).
183. Id. § 4-26-714.
184. The Business Corporation Act of 1987 applies to all corporations incorporated on or
after midnight, December 31, 1987. ARK. CODEANN. § 4–27–1706 (Supp. 1987).
185. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(a) (West 2018) (requiring the plaintiff in a
derivative action to have held shares or voting trust certificates contemporaneously with the
events giving rise to the complaint); see also id. § 4-27-740(a) (requiring the same).
186. Id. § 4-27-740(b).
187. However, Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 requires contemporaneous
ownership, that the plaintiff states with particularity the efforts made to secure initiation of
the action by the entity, and that the plaintiff fairly and adequately represents the interests of
the owners. SeeARK. RULESCIV. P. 23.1 Actions by Shareholders. Rule 23.1 does not require
security for expenses. But according to the Reporter’s Notes to Rule 23.1:
Both this [ARCP 23.1] and FRCP 23.1 are silent concerning the “security for
expenses” provision of many state business corporation acts, including that found
in Ark. Stat. Ann. 64-223(c), (d) (Repl. 1962). Since the decision in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949), it
has generally been considered that such acts were substantive in nature and
should be followed in diversity actions in federal courts. Consequently, the
adoption of this rule does not supersede or repeal the “security for expenses”
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The case law referencing the Arkansas security for expense statute does
not offer any explanation for the absence of a security for expense provision
in the Arkansas limited partnership laws.188 Thus, certain shareholders are
required to post a bond in Arkansas, while LLC members and limited
partners are not.
(c) Nevada
Nevada has a security for expense statute for corporate shareholders,
enacted in 1965,189 but does not have such a provision for LLC members or
limited partners, even though both groups have the statutory right to bring
derivative actions like their corporate counterparts.190
The Nevada statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a plaintiff.
As in Arkansas, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure add additional
requirements for derivative proceedings, paralleling Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1, including a requirement that the plaintiff make a formal
demand.191
Nevada gives its courts discretion to require any plaintiff to provide
security.192 There is no carve out for shareholders owning some threshold
provision found in the Arkansas Business Corporation Act.
ARK. R. CIV. P. 23.1, Reporter’s Notes to Rule 23.1.
188. In Sobba v. Elmen, the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas had
occasion to weigh in on the two Arkansas corporate statutes’ treatment of bond posting when
discussing Benton Window and Door, Little Rock Division, Inc. v. Garrett, 290 Ark. 244,
246, 718 S.W.2d 438, 439 (1986). The court noted that:
Garrett was decided under the 1965 Business Corporation Act, which allowed
the corporation in a derivative action to move for a hearing on whether the court
should require the shareholder plaintiff to furnish security if there was “no
reasonable possibility” that the case would benefit the corporation or its security
holders. Id. at 246, 718 S.W.2d at 439 (citing Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64–223, now
codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 4–26–714). Garrett noted that, under the 1965
statute, the corporation and the shareholder plaintiff “may be adversaries up to
[the resolution of the security hearing] at least.” Id. at 248, 718 S.W.2d at 440.
The Business Corporation Act of 1987 — to which the nominal defendants here
are subject — makes no provision for the corporation to file a motion to require
the plaintiff to furnish security. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4–27–740.
Sobba v. Elmen, 462 F. Supp. 2d 944, 948 (E.D. Ark. 2006).
189. NEV. REV. STAT § 41.520 (West 1997).
190. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 88.601, 86.483 (West 2017).
191. NEV. R. CIV. P. 23.1; FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3). Like the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1(b)(3), the Nevada statute also requires derivative plaintiffs to make a demand.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.520(2) (West 1997).
192. NEV. REV. STAT § 41.520(3).
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amount of stock to avoid posting security.193 The court will establish the
amount of security for reasonable expenses when it grants such a motion.
Unlike most other security for expense statutes, the Nevada statute does not
require court approval for a derivative suit to be settled.
The case law referencing the Nevada security for expense statute does
not offer any explanation for the absence of a security for expense provision
in the Nevada LLC or limited partnership laws.194 Thus, certain shareholders
are required to post a bond in Nevada, while LLC members and limited
partners are not.
(d) North Dakota
North Dakota has a security for expense statute for corporate
shareholders, enacted in 1985,195 but does not have such a provision for LLC
members or limited partners, even though both groups have the statutory
right to bring derivative actions like their corporate counterparts.196
The North Dakota statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a
plaintiff.197 Derivative plaintiffs holding less than five percent of any class
of the corporation’s stock and $25,000 or less of the corporation’s stock are
required to post a bond.198 There is no fixed dollar cap for the amount of the
bond.199
Upon termination of the suit, the court can order the plaintiff to pay the
corporation’s expenses if it finds that the derivative proceeding was brought
“without reasonable cause.”200 Unlike the California statute that has a ceiling
193. Id. § 41.520.
194. In Re Cook is the only case dealing with the bond posting requirement of the Nevada
statute. 444 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2011). A derivative plaintiff voluntarily posted a bond
in advance of a court order and eventually filed a motion to dismiss the derivative claims. Id.
at 209. The defendant objected, not necessarily to the claims being dismissed, but instead
contended that the plaintiffs should be required to post bond pursuant to the Nevada statute to
cover the defendant’s attorney’s fees. Id. at 208-10. The court declined to require a bond and
acknowledged that, under the terms of the statute, the bond is not an automatic right and
requires a court to make certain determinations before ordering such security to be posted.
N.D.CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-86(2) (1997). Here, the plaintiffs moved for dismissal before any
such demand for security was made, thus, before the hearing required by the statute to
determine if the bond should be ordered, and if so, how much. Id. The court then determined
that Section 41.520(2) is applicable to derivative suits only, and once such a suit is dismissed,
the statute no longer applies.
195. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-86(2) (1997).
196. Id. § 45-10.2-90; § 10-32.1-34.
197. Id. § 10-19.1-86.
198. Id. § 10-19.1-86(2).
199. Id. § 10-19.1-86(2)(b).
200. Id. § 10-19.1-86(1).
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dollar amount, the North Dakota statute allows for the full amount of such
expenses to be paid.201
No North Dakota cases explore the security for expense process. Thus,
certain shareholders are required to post a bond in North Dakota, while LLC
members and limited partners are not.
Like the lawmakers in New York, lawmakers in Alaska, Arkansas,
Nevada and North Dakota made the effort to protect the derivative litigation
process from nuisance or strike suits by including security for expense
provisions in their corporate law. They seemingly did not see the need to
put similar protection in for LLCs and limited partnerships. Here the
lawmakers did not comment in the legislative history about whether they
even considered including a security for expense provision, and if they did
consider it, why it was ultimately left out. This likely will not stop parties
from arguing about whether any omissions were intentional, as seen in the
New York case of Tzolis v. Wolff.202
The inconsistencies in enacting a security for expense provision is a
curious choice, since the rights and roles of the corporate shareholder and
limited partner are substantially similar. The vulnerabilities they face
without having an active role in management are substantially similar. The
statutes authorizing derivative actions for owners of both corporations and
limited partnerships are substantially similar. Yet the corporate statutes in
these four states contain a security for expense provision, so certain
shareholders are required to post a bond while LLC members [to the extent
they are even permitted to bring derivative suits] and limited partners are not,
with no stated or even implied explanation for the distinction.
2. States Adopting Security for Expense Provisions for Corporate
Shareholders and for Limited Partners
Colorado, New Jersey, and New York all have security for expense
provisions for their shareholders and limited partners, but no such provisions
for their LLC members. An evaluation of how these states organize their
various business entity statutes offers no conclusive insights into why this is
so. None of these three states list corporations and limited partnerships
together,203 which would support the notion that lawmakers in those states
201. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982).
202. See Part II supra for a discussion of the Tzolis v. Wolff case.
203. Colorado classifies its corporations, LLCs, and LPS all under its Title 7.
Corporations and Associations. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-101 to 7-117-105; §§7-80-101 to
7-80-1101; §§ 7-62-101 to 7-62-1105. New Jersey classifies its corporations under Title 14A.
Corporations, General. N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A §§ 1-1 to 16-4 (West); New Jersey classifies its
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consider LLCs to be more like corporations than partnerships. Further, New
York lawmakers excluded derivative suits from their initial LLC statute,
while authorizing them for shareholders and limited partners, which offers
at least some explanation for the lack of a security for expense provision in
their LLC statute.204
(a) Colorado
Colorado has a security for expense provision for limited partners,
effective November 1, 1981,205 and one for shareholders, effective July 1,
1994.206 These statutes were designed to reduce the filing of nuisance or
strike suits.207 Yet Colorado has no security for expense provision for LLC
members, who could also theoretically file nuisance or strike suits; their
limited partner status arguably does not make them any less likely to bring
such a suit.
Colorado’s LLC statute has three provisions that are not present in the
corporate or limited partnership statute. The LLC statute requires a written
demand with no provision for demand futility.208 The LLC statute requires
LLCs and LPs under its Title 42. Partnerships and Partnership Associations. N.J. STAT. ANN.
42 §§ 2C-1 to 2C-94; 42 §§ 2A-1 to 2A-73. New York classifies its corporations under
Business Corporation Law. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 101-2001 (McKinney); New York
classifies its LLCs under Limited Liability Company Law. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. §§ 101-1403;
and New York characterizes its LPs under its Partnership Law. N.Y. P’SHIP LAW §§ 90-119
(McKinney).
204. See Part II supra for a discussion of Tzolis v. Wolff.
205. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-62-1003.
206. Id. § 7-107-402.
207. According to Sheila K. Hyatt and Stephen A. Hess:
Most of the special features of the shareholders’ derivative action are designed to
reduce the filing of frivolous “strike” suits by shareholders, which otherwise
would be easily brought. Due to the expense and inconvenience attendant to such
suits (most involve opening the corporation’s books and accounts to the plaintiff),
the rule provides at least some potential screening effect for the protection of the
corporation.
SHEILA K. HYATT & STEPHEN A. HESS, WEST’S COLORADO PRACTICE SERIES: CIVIL RULES
ANNOTATED R 23.1 (5th ed.).
208. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-714. The Editors’ Notes preceding Part 4. Actions by
Shareholders in the corporate code offers this “Introductory Note to Part 4:”
While the Model Act’s correlative provisions on derivative proceedings contain
provisions reflecting recent statutory and judicial developments in this area in
other jurisdictions—in particular, provisions governing pre-litigation demands
upon the corporation and the power of independent directors to dismiss a
derivative action—the Colorado Bar Association adopted a position of neutrality
on these controversial matters by proposing to continue the Code’s existing
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that the member “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
members similarly situated in enforcing the rights of the limited liability
company.”209 And the LLC statute requires court approval in order to
discontinue or settle the suit.210 All three of these requirements are picked
up in the Colorado Civil Rules, under Rule 23.1 which provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or
members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an
unincorporated association, the corporation or association having
failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the
complaint shall be verified and shall allege that the plaintiff was a
shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he
complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on
him by operation of law. The complaint shall also allege with
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and,
if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons
for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the
right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.211
The Colorado Practice Series notes that both the corporate statutes and
the limited partnership statutes “should be read in conjunction with Rule
23.1,” with no reference to the LLC statute.212 But by its terms, Rule 23.1
includes members of an unincorporated association, which should include
LLCs.213
The corporate, LLC, and limited partnership statutes all require
contemporaneous ownership with very consistent language.214 All three
statutes provide that the court can order the plaintiff to pay the expenses of
the defendant, including attorney’s fees, if the action was brought “without
provisions, and that proposal was adopted by the General Assembly in the Act.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § T. 7, Art. 107, Pt. 4, Refs & Annos (West).
209. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-713(1)(b).
210. Id. § 7-80-717.
211. COLO. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
212. “Section 7-107-402, C.R.S. should be read in conjunction with this rule.” HYATT&
HESS, supra note 207.
213. COLO. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
214. COLO. REV. STAT.§ § 7-80-713(1)(a); 7-107-402(1); 7-62-1001(1(c).
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reasonable cause”215 or was “commenced or maintained without reasonable
cause or for an improper purpose.”216
Although there is no security for expense provision in Colorado’s LLC
statute, the statute does deal with the payment of expense on a post factum
basis.217 The statute provides that if the court finds that the derivative suit
“resulted in a substantial benefit” to the LLC, the court can order the LLC to
pay the plaintiff’s reasonable expenses, including attorney fees.218 This
provision in the LLC act is the only provision even touching on expenses.
The corporate and limited partnership statutes do not have this
provision and instead require a bond to be posted; the bond posting statutes
are quite similar. Each has the same carve-out, exempting owners with 5%
or more of the outstanding corporate shares219 or total limited partnership
contributions220 as applicable.
Both statutes permit the entity to require the plaintiff to give security
for the costs and reasonable expenses in defense of such action, excluding
attorneys’ fees.221 There is no fixed dollar cap for the amount of the bond
under either statute, which can be “from time to time . . . increased or
decreased, in the discretion of the court, upon showing that the security
provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.”222 The Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure contain additional requirements for all derivative
proceedings, paralleling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, including the
requirement that a plaintiff make a formal demand.223
The Colorado statutes provide that if the court determines that the
215. Id. § 7-62-1002; 7-107-402.
216. Id. § 7-80-718.
217. Payment of expenses—derivative proceeding:
On the termination of a derivative proceeding commenced pursuant to this part
7, where the court finds that the proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit
to the limited liability company, the court may order the limited liability company
to pay the plaintiff’s reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred by
the plaintiff in connection with the maintenance of such proceeding. On the
termination of a derivative proceeding commenced pursuant to this part 7, where
the court finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained without
reasonable cause or for an improper purpose, the court may order the plaintiff to
pay any of the defendant’s reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred
by the defendant in connection with the defense of such proceeding.
Id.
218. Id. § 7-80-718.
219. Id. § 7-107-402(3).
220. Id. § 7-62-1003.
221. Id. § 7-107-402(3); § 7-62-1003.
222. Id. § 7-107-402(3); § 7-62-1003.
223. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3); COLO. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
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derivative action was commenced without reasonable cause, the entity shall
have recourse to the security upon termination of the action.224 If the “costs
and expenses exceed the amount of the bond or if no bond is posted,” the
derivative plaintiff must “pay the costs and reasonable expenses directly
attributable to the defense” of the derivative suit, excluding attorney’s fees.225
No Colorado case law discusses the corporate or limited partner
security for expense statutes or the LLC expense provision.
(b) New Jersey
New Jersey has a security for expense provision for limited partners,
effective September 21, 1988, and one for shareholders, effective April 1,
2013.226 The New Jersey Corporate and Business Law Study Commission
indicated that the purpose of the corporate statute is “to allow corporations
to avoid derivative lawsuits that impose excessive and unnecessary costs on
New Jersey corporations.”227 Even though New Jersey has provisions in both
its corporate and limited partnership laws, it has no security for expense for
LLC members.
The limited partnership statute is a pared down version of the
shareholder statute. Both statutes require contemporaneous ownership by a
plaintiff.228 Both statutes require the plaintiff to make a demand.229 But the
corporate statute requires that derivative plaintiffs fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the corporation in the action, while the limited
partnership statute does not.230 The corporate statute requires court approval
before a derivative suit can be “discontinued or settled,” but the limited
partnership statute does not.231
Upon termination of a shareholder derivative suit, the court can order
224. COLO. REV. STAT. § § 7-107-402(3); § 7-62-1003.
225. STEPHEN A. HESS, WEST’S COLORADO PRACTICE SERIES: METHODS OF PRACTICE §
2:66 (8th ed.).
226. N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.8 (2013).
227. New Jersey Senate Commerce Committee Statement, N.J. LEGISLATURE (Jan. 14,
2013), https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2012/Bills/A3500/3123_S2.HTM [https://perma.cc/L52
K-VB8S]. “The bill is largely based on sections 7.40 to 7.47 of the Model Business
Corporation Act, with substantial additions based on section 7.44 of Chapter 156D of the
Massachusetts Business Corporation Law.” Id.
228. N.J. REV. STAT. § 42-2A-63; §14A:3-6.2.
229. The LP statute doesn’t explicitly say that demand is required; instead, it requires that
that the complaint set forth with particularity the plaintiff’s efforts to get the general partner
to act or give the reasons for not making the demand. N.J. REV. STAT. § 42:2A-64. The
corporate statute explicitly requires that plaintiff make a demand. Id. § 14A:3-6.3.
230. Id. § 14A:3-6.2 (2013).
231. Id. § 14A:3-6.6.
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the corporation to pay the plaintiffs’ expenses if it finds that the derivative
proceeding resulted in a “substantial benefit” to the corporation.232 If the
court finds that the shareholder suit was commenced or maintained without
the exercise of “reasonable diligence by the plaintiff or without reasonable
cause or for an improper purpose,” the court can order the plaintiff to pay the
defendant’s expenses in defending the proceeding.233 The New Jersey
shareholder statute allows for the full amount of such expenses to be paid.234
And finally, under the shareholder statute, the court can order either party to
pay the other’s expenses for filing pleadings, motions, or other papers
frivolously.235 None of these provisions are included in the limited
partnership statute.
Both statutes have a carve out for substantial owners. Under the
corporate statute, derivative plaintiffs are not required to post a bond if they
hold at least five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock or $250,000
or more of the corporation’s stock.236 There is no fixed dollar cap for the
amount of the bond.237 The limited partnership statute has the same concept
but with a much lower market value. Plaintiffs are carved out if they own at
least “5% or more of the contributions of or allocations to partnership
property of all limited partners” or unless “the contributions of or the share
allocable to the plaintiff . . . ha[s] a fair value in excess of twenty-five
thousand dollars.”238 Under the limited partnership statute, the amount of the
security is determined by the court.239
The only New Jersey cases that mention the security for expense
232. N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.7(1) (2013).
233. N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.7(2) (2013).
234. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982) (limiting the bond furnished by
plaintiff for reasonable expenses to fifty thousand dollars), with N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.7
(2013) (requiring a plaintiff to pay any expenses incurred by the defendant in defending the
proceeding).
235. The statute provides that the court may:
(3) order a party to pay an opposing party’s expenses incurred because of the
filing of a pleading, motion or other paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion or
other paper was not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry, or warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or
reversal of existing law and was interposed for an improper purpose, such as to
harass or cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.7(3) (2013).
236. N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.8 (2013). The statute was amended in 2013 to raise the
dollar amount needed to avoid posting a bond from $25,000 to $250,000. N.J. LEGISLATURE,
supra note 227.
237. N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3-6.8 (2013).
238. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2A-65 (1985).
239. Id.
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provision hold that the bond requirement is inapplicable.240
(c) New York
New York has a security for expense provision for limited partners,
effective July 1, 1991,241 and one for shareholders, originally enacted in
1944.242 One goal of the corporate statute was to “meet the evil posed by
baseless strike shareholders’ suits” and to protect corporations from the
“abuse of derivative actions instituted by stockholders having small or
minuscule interests in a large corporation,” since “stockholder[s] motivated
by personal gain instead of the welfare of the corporation” would be deterred
by the threshold from bringing a frivolous action.243 Even though New York
has provisions in both its corporate and limited partnership laws, it has no
security for expense provision for LLC members.244
Unlike New Jersey, the New York version for limited partners tracks
the shareholder version to a large extent. Both statutes require
contemporaneous ownership by a plaintiff.245 Both require the plaintiff to
set forth with particularity the efforts made to secure the initiation of the
action by the entity.246 Both require court approval before a derivative suit
can be “discontinued, compromised or settled.”247
Both statutes exclude from the bond posting requirement any derivative
plaintiff holding at least five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock
240. See Seidman v. Spencer Savings Bank, SLA, Nos. A-2039-17T3, A-4739-17T4, 2019
WL 4891167 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 3, 2019), cert. denied, 241 N.J. 144, 226 A.3d
500 (2020), and cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 554, 208 L. Ed. 2d 176 (2020) (holding that the bond
requirement does not apply for a party that is not a New Jersey general business association);
Feuer v. Merck &Co., 187 A.3d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018) (noting that the plaintiff
would need to post security under the statute); see also Live Face on Web, LLC v. Emerson
Cleaners, Inc., No. 14-00182, 2014WL 2805040 (D.N.J. June 20, 2014) (referencing N.J.S.A.
14A:3–6.8 and noting that it was inapplicable).
241. New York retains its prior limited partnership statute, N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § § 115-
a for limited partnerships formed before July 1, 1991. Sections 115-a and 115-b governing
derivative suits against LPS are virtually identical to the parallel sections of the new statute,
N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § §§ 121-1002 and 1003.
242. For a discussion of the history of security for expense provisions in New York,
starting with the WOODREPORT, see Albert, supra note 3, at 40–45.
243. Roach v. Franchises Int’l, Inc., 300 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
244. See Part II, supra.
245. N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 121-1002(b) (McKinney 2021); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(b)
(McKinney 2021).
246. N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 121-1002(c) (McKinney 2021); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(c)
(McKinney 2021).
247. N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 121-1002(d) (McKinney 2021); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(d)
(McKinney 2021).
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or five percent of the contributions of all limited partners, or at least $50,000
ownership interests.248 There is no fixed dollar cap for the amount of the
bond, which can be increased or decreased from time to time, “in the
discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such action upon showing that
the security provided has or may become inadequate or excessive.”249
The New York case law regarding security for expense is primarily in
the LLC area, stemming from Tzolis v. Wolf.250 The two cases referencing
the limited partnership statute simply cite the statute or apply it.251
Lawmakers in Alaska, Arkansas, Nevada and North Dakota have not
revealed why they chose to enact legislation in order to protect the derivative
litigation process from nuisance or strike suits by shareholders but ignored
LLC members and limited partners. What is even more curious is that
Colorado, New Jersey, and New York noted the risk of these suits by limited
partners, but somehow did not concern themselves with the possible
behavior of opportunistic LLC members. Other than the commentary
surrounding Tzolis v. Wolff, no clear reasons are given for this omission.252
3. States Requiring Security for Expense for Corporate Shareholders,
Limited Liability Company Members, and Limited Partners
California and Pennsylvania are the only two states that have security
for expense statutes for their shareholders, LLC members, and limited
partners. An evaluation of how these states organize their various business
entity statutes offers some possible insights into why this is so. Both states
classify their corporate, LLC, and limited partnership statutes together.253
That said:
248. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627; (McKinney 2021); N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 121-1003
(McKinney 2021).
249. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2021). Similar language can be found in
New York’s partnership laws. N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 121-1003 (McKinney 2021).
250. See Part II, supra.
251. For a full discussion of the New York case law, see Albert, supra note 3.
252. For a discussion of the Tzolis v. Wolff case, see Part II, supra.
253. California classifies its corporations, LLCs and LPs all under its Corporations Code.
See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 100-195 (2005) (including general provisions and definitions for
general corporations); §§ 17701.01-17713.13 (2013) (defining the general provisions for
limited liability companies); §§ 15900-15901.17 (2007) (providing general provisions for
limited partnerships). Pennsylvania classifies corporations, LLCs, and LPs under Title 15
Pa.C.S.A. Corporations and Unincorporated Associations, and further breaks down that title
into Part II Corporations and Part III Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies. See 15
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 501-1997 (1988) (encompassing legislative matters related to
corporations); §§ 8811-8885 (2016) (including statutes related to limited liability companies);
§§ 8611-8695 (2016) (dealing with limited partnerships).
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(a) California
California has a security for expense provision for shareholders,254LLC
members,255 and limited partners.256 The corporate statute was effective
January 1, 1977.257 The LLC statute was effective September 30, 1994.258
The limited partnership statute was effective January 1, 2008.259 California
courts have noted that a goal of the corporate statute is “to give the
corporation security against groundless suits on the part of shareholders”260
and to “prevent unwarranted shareholder derivative lawsuits.”261
While the three California statutes are very similar in both concept and
wording, there are a handful of differences, mostly in the limited partnership
statute. All three statutes authorize the defendant to move for a court order
to require the plaintiff to furnish security for the reasonable expenses that
such moving party might incur.262 These expenses explicitly include
attorney’s fees.263 The grounds for such a motion are either that the plaintiff
has no reasonable possibility of success or that the moving party (other than
the entity itself) did not participate in the transaction complained of in any
capacity.264
Both the corporate and the LLC statutes require contemporaneous
ownership by a plaintiff, but not absolute contemporaneous owners as
commonly seen in most other statutes. California’s spin on this concept does
not block derivative suits if the plaintiff cannot show contemporaneous
254. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c), (d) (West 1982). “Few statutes in California are asked to
do the kind of heavy lifting that is required of Corporations Code Section 800. Fewer than
1,000 words in length, Section 800 represents the sum total of all legislation on the subject of
shareholder derivative litigation in California.” Charles J. Greaves, The Unique Issues in
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2002, at 16, 16. The opening language of
the corporate statute is curious, defining “corporation” to include unincorporated associations.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(a) (West 1982). This arguably could include both LLCs and limited
partnerships, obviating the need entirely for the LLC and limited partnership security for
expense statutes.
255. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17709.02 (2013).
256. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15910.06 (2007).
257. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2300.
258. Stats. 1994, c. 1200 (S.B.469), § 27, eff. Sept. 30, 1994.
259. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 495 (A.B. 339) (West).
260. Barber v. Lewis & Kaufman, Inc., 269 P.2d 929, 931 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
261. Donner Mgmt. Co. v. Schaffer, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
262. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c), (d) (West 1982); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17709.02(b) (2013);
CAL. CORP. CODE §15910.06(a) (2007).
263. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982); CAL. CORP. CODE §17709.02(c)(2) (2013);
CAL. CORP. CODE §15910.06(b) (2007).
264. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c) (West 1982); CAL. CORP. CODE §17709.02(b) (2013);
CAL. CORP. CODE §15910.06(a) (2007).
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ownership like the typical derivative statute. Rather, the statute gives courts
a list of considerations to apply when using its discretion to permit the action
to go forward even in the absence of contemporaneous ownership.265 Oddly,
the limited partnership statute doesn’t require contemporaneous ownership
at all.
Both the corporate and the LLC statutes require the plaintiff to state
with particularity the efforts made to secure initiation of the action by the
entity and to inform the managers of the claim or deliver a “true copy of the
complaint that the plaintiff proposes to file.”266 Again, the limited
partnership statute is silent on this issue.
It is odd that the limited partnership statute is missing these provisions,
since it was clearly derived from the corporate statute.267 According to the
bill’s sponsor:
The new Act has been drafted for a world in which limited liability
partnerships and limited liability companies can meet many of the
needs formerly met by limited partnerships. This Act therefore
targets two types of enterprises that seem largely beyond the scope
of LLPs and LLCs: (i) sophisticated, manager-focused
commercial deals whose participants commit for the long term,
and (ii) estate planning arrangements (family limited
partnerships). This Act accordingly assumes that, more often than
not, people utilizing it will want: strong centralized management,
and passive investors.268
All three statutes make it clear that a ruling by the court on the motion
for security “shall not be a determination of any issue in the action or of the
265. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17709.02(a)(1) provides:
The criteria are:
(A) There is a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of
the limited liability company.
(B) No other similar action has been or is likely to be instituted.
(C) The plaintiff acquired the interest before there was disclosure to the public or
to the plaintiff of the wrongdoing of which plaintiff complains.
(D) Unless the action can be maintained, the defendant may retain a gain derived
from defendant’s willful breach of a fiduciary duty.
(E) The requested relief will not result in unjust enrichment of the limited liability
company or any member of the limited liability company.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17709.02(a)(1) (2013).
266. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17709.02(a)(2) (2013).
267. JAMES F. FOTENOS & EDWARD C. RYBKA, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE PASS-
THROUGH ENTITIESCH. 5-C (2020).
268. Bill Analysis: AB-339 Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, CAL.
LEGIS. INFO. (Aug. 28, 2006), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtm
l?bill_id=200520060AB339 [https://perma.cc/SBV6-4P68].
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merits thereof.”269 Despite this language, if the motion for security is
granted, it likely ends the lawsuit. Why would any rational derivative
plaintiff agree to post $50,000 after the court decided the suit indicated that
either there is no reasonable possibility of success or that the defendant was
not involved in the complained-of act in any capacity?270
The biggest substantive difference among these statutes is that only the
LLC statute gives the court flexibility to change the amount of the security,
but in no case can the amount exceed $50,000.271 This provision allowing
flexibility is absent from both the corporate and the limited partnership
statutes, though it is limited on the top end to the cap of $50,000. This
threshold is an aggregate, and the court cannot require a greater bond, even
if there are multiple defendants or causes of action.272
Unlike most other security for expense statutes, the California statutes
have no statutory threshold ownership amount that must be held by plaintiffs
to avoid posting the bond. Rather, the court has discretion to require any
plaintiff to provide security.273 If the motion is granted, the court will
establish the amount of security for reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, again not to exceed $50,000.274
California courts have provided guidance with respect to the scope and
meaning of this statute.275
269. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d)(West 2020); CAL. CORP. CODE §17709.02(b)(West 2021);
CAL. CORP. CODE §15910.06(c)(2)(West 2019).
270. See Greaves, supra note 254, at 16–17 (pointing out that “few disgruntled
shareholders will pose a $50,000 bond in the face of a judicial determination that there is no
reasonable possibility that further prosecution of the action will benefit the corporation or its
shareholders”).
271. The LLC statute provides:
The amount of the security may thereafter be increased or decreased in the
discretion of the court upon a showing that the security provided has or may
become inadequate or is excessive, but the court shall not in any event increase
the total amount of the security beyond fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in the
aggregate for all defendants.
CAL. CORP. CODE §17709.02(c)(2)(West 2021).
272. Hale v. S. Cal. IPA Med. Grp., Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
273. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d)(West 2020); CAL. CORP. CODE §17709.02(b)(West 2021);
CAL. CORP. CODE §15910.06(c)(2)(West 2019).
274. Id.
275. “Because the statutory scheme governing shareholder derivative actions in California
is skeletal, and because these actions are equitable in nature, the courts have played a
prominent role in shaping the substantive law and procedure in this area.” Greaves, supra
note 254, at 18. For a full discussion of the California case law, see Albert, supra note 3.
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(b) Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has a security for expense statute for shareholders, LLC
members, and limited partners,276 all effective February 21, 2017. Based on
their common effective date, one could surmise that the statutes would be
similar. In fact, the coverage, the wording, and even the numbering of the
sections is consistent, if not identical. This makes sense since the “Editors’
Notes” to the LLC statute indicate that it was modeled after the corporate
statute.277
All three statutes require derivative plaintiffs to make a formal demand
“in record form and give notice with reasonable specificity of the essential
facts relied upon to support each of the claims made in the demand,” unless
such a demand is excused.278
The two differences between the statutes are that only the corporate and
LLC statutes require contemporaneous ownership by a plaintiff or the
showing of “a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf
of the corporation and that without the action serious injustice will result.”279
And only the corporate statute requires court approval before a derivative
suit can be “dismissed or compromised.”280
All three require that derivative plaintiffs are subject to the security
posting provision if they hold less than a five percent ownership stake and
hold ownership interests with an aggregate fair market value of $200,000 or
less.281 There is no fixed dollar cap for the amount of the bond, which can
be increased or decreased from time to time, “in the discretion of the court
upon showing that the security provided has or is likely to become
inadequate or excessive.”282
California and Pennsylvania are the only two states that brought bond
posting to shareholders, LLC members, and limited partners, presumably
recognizing that all three populations have the potential to bring nuisance or
strike suits. Evaluating the success of these statutes in weeding out nuisance
or strike suits is complicated. There is no clear or objective mechanism to
quantify the number and legitimacy of lawsuits that were not brought
because the plaintiff could not post the bond. If these provisions are actually
276. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8693 (2017).
277. See 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8883 (West 2017) (noting in the Editors’
Notes that “[t]his section is patterned after 15 Pa.C.S. §1782(c)”).
278. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1781(a)(1)-(2),(c); 8882(a)(1)-(2), (c); 8692(a)(1)-(2),
(c)(2017).
279. 231 PA. CODE § 1506(d) (1991).
280. Id.
281. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1782(c)(2017).
282. Id.
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useful in stopping these suits, and that has not been objectively determined,
the Pennsylvania approach of using share value or ownership percentage as
a proxy for plaintiffs’ good faith and a lack of opportunistic behavior may
prove to be an absolute barrier to entry for even the most well-intentioned
plaintiffs acting in good faith, with a legitimate concern, who simply lack the
funds to post the required bond.283 The California approach is even more
dangerous in this regard; with no carve-out for substantial owners, any
plaintiff may be subject to the bond posting requirement. The timing of these
statutes can also be a barrier for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs must post the bond
before filing the suit, and this may be difficult for even the most well-
intentioned and honorable derivative plaintiff who is light on funds. These
statutes may wind up imposing a greater economic risk on the plaintiff than
just requiring plaintiffs to pay the successful defendants’ expenses after the
case has been resolved.284
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Security for expense provisions have their share of supporters, as
evidenced by the fourteen different statutes in nine different states requiring
them. Robert Wood was an early and dedicated supporter, based on his
concern for the then state of derivative litigation. In the Wood Report, he
noted that an “outstanding fact derived” from his research was that most of
the shareholder derivative suits he studied were unsuccessful, and that the
financial results were unfavorable to the plaintiffs but more favorable to their
counsel.285 The Wood Report rejected a number of other approaches to fix
the problem of strike suits and ultimately concluded that a security for
expense statute would allow shareholders to determine whether to move
283. “The potential of first having to give security and then the prospect of forfeiting it
must exert a chilling effect on counsel and client.” Branson, supra note 143, at 405.
284. DEMOTT, supra note 36, at 3:1.
285. As per Wood:
Because of the large recoveries had in a few instances involving nationally known
corporations, the enormous fees awarded plaintiffs’ attorneys in those cases and
the resulting newspaper publicity, there has been a definite tendency on the part
of the public and the bar to assume a ratio of success in these actions not in accord
with the record. In direct consequence of this general misconception, the
common attitude on the part of laymen and lawyers has been, while admitting the
abuses in this field of litigation, to condone them as necessary evils or as
outweighed by the assumed beneficial effects of such litigation. The record of
these cases should demonstrate the fallacy of this last assumption, and without
that all excuses for further indulgence of the abuses fails.
WOODREPORT, supra note 32, at 112.
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forward with a case “safeguarded by the requirement that the plaintiff have
a legitimate interest in the subject-matter and assume reasonable
responsibility in the way of costs in the event of failure.”286
But are shareholders, or any entity owners for that matter, truly
“safeguarded” by these provisions? Or are minority owners denied the one
mechanism available to hold their managers accountable? These statutes’
use of share value or ownership percentage as a proxy for good faith and a
lack of opportunistic behavior may instead prove to be an absolute barrier to
entry for even the most well-intentioned plaintiffs acting in good faith with
a legitimate concern, who simply lack the funds to post the required bond.287
The timing may be problematic as well, for even well-intentioned plaintiffs
who are light on funds prior to filing their meritorious suit; these statutes
may impose greater economic risk on these plaintiffs than a system that
instead requires unsuccessful plaintiffs to pay the defendant’s expenses at
the end of the lawsuit.
Owning a substantial ownership piece should arguably inspire owners
not to behave opportunistically, or against the best interest of the entity, but
there are no guarantees.288 Owners are not necessarily rational and may have
issues on their minds other than the entity’s financial bottom line.289
286. Id. at 116–67
287. See DEMOTT, supra note 36 at § 3:2 (evaluating state security for expense statutes).
288. According to Professor Hamermesh:
[T]here is nothing in the statute that assures that a holder or a group of holders
with sufficient shares to avoid the bond requirement will have resources or
motivations adequate to ensure an informed, deliberate, and disinterested
assessment of the merits of the litigation. If only because of collective action
problems, it seems eminently possible that disaggregated stockholders will
underinvest in efforts to evaluate and then support meritorious litigation; and, it
seems equally possible that stockholders with enough shares to avoid the bond
requirement but, without the inclination to invest in evaluating derivative claims,
could choose to support litigation that lacks merit. In sum, what the New York
security for expense statute lacks is any assurance that the persons (other than
plaintiff’s counsel) whose decisions determine whether a bond is required will
expend any resources to evaluate the quality of the derivative claims to be
pursued.
Larry Hamermesh, A Most Adequate Response to Excessive Shareholder Litigation, 45
HOFSTRA L. REV. 147, 156 (2016).
289.
The theory implicitly assumes that stockholders with less than the required
threshold will not bring meritorious claims; the sole metric to determine if a
shareholder is acting in good faith and, thus, should be permitted a day in court,
is the amount of stock owned. The idea presumes that a major shareholder has a
financial interest in not wasting corporate time and resources on a frivolous claim
and may be deterred from posting the required bond.
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Ownership amount is not a perfect standard to measure whether a particular
owner is willing to waste the entity’s time and money. Yet, owners whose
holdings are below the relevant statutory threshold are required to provide
security in order for their claims to move forward, and those at or above the
threshold are exempt. As with any bright line test, some meritorious suits
may not be brought, and some spurious suits may move forward.
According to Professor DeMott, “The present trend appears to be away
from reposing great confidence in the ability of security requirements to
deter strike suits.”290 How can we balance the desire to help and empower
owners to hold their entities accountable with the need for managerial
freedom and discretion to discharge their fiduciary duties without spurious
and time-wasting litigation?
Lawmakers can and should use other procedural hurdles that may be
more likely to limit nuisance or strike suits. Litigating demand futility, for
example, brings judicial evaluation into the process to decide whether the
people making the decision should be making the decision.
Owners with legitimate concerns who do not meet the required
ownership thresholder could find like-minded fellow owners and together
aggregate their ownership to hit the statutory threshold and avoid posting the
bond.291 But the aggregation must be done before the suit is filed, so that the
filing plaintiff “holds” the requisite ownership amount.292
States should revisit the Prototype Act approach on this issue, which
arguably has merit even for states that have not adopted the remainder of that
act. Requiring that derivative plaintiffs be authorized by fellow owners who
Albert, supra note 3, at 39.
290. DEMOTT, supra note 36 at § 3:1.
291. Courts have opined that the language, “unless the plaintiff or plaintiffs hold five
percent or more,” allows plaintiffs to aggregate their shares with intervenors. See, e.g., Miller
v. Victor, No. 14-cv-1819 (PKC), 2015 WL 892276, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015) (“New
York law allows a plaintiff to aggregate his holdings with intervenors.”).
292. According to Professor DeMott:
The problems raised by aggregation stem from the interplay between the
contemporaneous ownership requirement and the exemption provisions
in security for expense statutes. The plaintiff, in order to satisfy the
contemporaneous ownership rule, must have owned some shares in the company
as of the time of the occurrence of the wrong alleged in the suit; to be exempt
from the security for expense requirements, the original plaintiff and any
intervenors must own shares in excess of the threshold amount or percentage set
by the statute. The problem is whether the purpose of the contemporaneous
ownership rule is frustrated if the plaintiff can be exempted from
the security requirements by acquiring shares after the time of the wrong alleged
in the suit.
DEMOTT, supra note 36 at § 3:9.
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own more than fifty percent of the unreturned contributions will likely
improve the odds that spurious suits brought by owners with individual or
untenable gripes will not be filed. Rather than using some nominal
ownership proxy like a 5% ownership threshold, this approach literally
requires majority buy in. Unless of course the majority is voting to cover up
their own misdeeds.293
And finally, in the absence of any meaningful way to quantify whether
these security for expense provisions are helpful, legislators from every state,
regardless of whether they have a security for expense provision, should
focus more on dealing with repayment of expenses after adjudication. It may
be more prudent to adopt an approach that allows courts to award costs to
unsuccessful derivative plaintiffs ex post, instead of requiring security to be
posted ex ante. These security for expense statutes put a significant risk on
derivative plaintiffs if the defendant is successful. By permitting defendants
to demand that plaintiffs post security well in advance of any final outcome,
plaintiffs are exposed to a greater economic risk than they would be if instead
the rule required payment of the successful defendant’s expenses after the
litigation concluded.294
The Colorado LLC statute does just that, although legislative guidance
on what constitutes a “reasonable cause” would be helpful here:
On the termination of a derivative proceeding commenced
pursuant to this part 7, where the court finds that the proceeding
has resulted in a substantial benefit to the limited liability
company, the court may order the limited liability company to pay
the plaintiff’s reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
incurred by the plaintiff in connection with the maintenance of
such proceeding. On the termination of a derivative proceeding
commenced pursuant to this part 7, where the court finds that the
proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable
cause or for an improper purpose, the court may order the plaintiff
to pay any of the defendant’s reasonable expenses, including
attorney fees, incurred by the defendant in connection with the
defense of such proceeding.295
This provision tracks MBCA § 7.46(1).296 The MBCA comments note
that the test of this section is that “the action was brought without reasonable
cause or for an improper purpose is appropriate to deter strike suits, on the
one hand, and on the other hand to protect plaintiffs whose suits have a
293. WOODREPORT, supra note 32, at 24.
294. DEMOTT, supra note 36, at § 3:1.
295. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-718 (1994).
296. MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 7.46(1)(2007).
682 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 23:3
reasonable foundation.”297 The comments further note that the substantial
benefit requirement is needed “to prevent the plaintiff from proposing
inconsequential changes in order to justify the payment of counsel fees,”
circling back to Robert Wood’s view that derivative suits were driven by
plaintiffs’ counsel.298
V. CONCLUSION:
If the goal of security for expense statutes is to act as a sieve and
somehow weed out strike suits that have no merit, this goal should be as
applicable to LLC owners and limited partners as it is to shareholders; LLC
members and limited partners could also bring nuisance or strike suits. Part
of the challenge here is that there is no objective mechanism to determine if
the security for expense provisions are actually working. The absences of
any reliable metric to quantify the number and legitimacy of lawsuits that
were not brought because the plaintiff was unable to post the bond makes
any determination of their success impracticable.
Nine states have security for expense statutes for corporate
shareholders; three of those states also have such a provision for their limited
partners; and only two states have such a provision for shareholders, LLC
members, and limited partners. Assuming that the presence of security for
expense provisions in the corporate laws that is absent in the LLC and/or
limited partnership laws was actually intentional on the part of the relevant
lawmakers, it is hard to imagine why the provisions were excluded. Perhaps
the thought was that the number of unhappy limited partners or LLC
members would somehow be lower than their corporate counterparts. Or
perhaps the theory is that LLCmembers and/or limited partners are somehow
more invested in the success of the enterprise and thus, less likely than
shareholders to bring nuisance or strike suits. In the absence of any clear
direction from lawmakers through legislative history, or even press releases
or interviews, there can be no clear answers to these queries, leaving just the
unexplained inconsistencies.
297. MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 7.46 cmt. (2007).
298. Wood did not have kind words for the shareholder derivative bar, referring to the
“shoddy burlesque of a professional relationship to clients [that] makes the ambulance-chaser
by comparison a paragon of propriety.” WOODREPORT, supra note 32, at 47.
